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The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law:
Property Logic in Restraint of
Competition
by
RUDOLPH J. PERITZ*
I
Though modem antitrust scholars, policy makers, and judges agree
on very little, they do concur on two fundamental propositions. First,
they agree that "courts should refuse to validate any private arrangement
restricting competition on the basis of a claim that the arrangement ad-
vances other social ends."' In short, "competition" constitutes the only
legitimate policy basis for antitrust doctrine. Second, they agree that the
Supreme Court's adoption of the "rule of reason" in 1911 represents the
emergence of modem antitrust law.2 That is, the "rule of reason" affords
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. Some of the research for this
Essay was done while a Langdell Fellow at Harvard Law School. I would like to express my
appreciation to the Law School, as well as to friends and colleagues who gave helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts, especially Michael Botein, David Gray Carlson, John Flynn, Janice
Haney-Peritz, Duncan Kennedy, David Schoenbrod, Katherine van Wezel Stone, and G. Ed-
ward White. Speeches based on versions of this Article were presented to the Conference on
Systems Science and Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School on June 26, 1987, and to the Criti-
cal Legal Studies Conference at American University, Washington College of Law, on October
1, 1988.
This Article constitutes the historical and theoretical foundation for a series of studies of
modem antitrust law. The first, entitled A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, is forth-
coming in 40 HASTINGS L.J. (1989) (March issue).
1, L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 182 (1977); see P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TExT, CASES 5, 8, 7-43, 49-50 (3d ed 1981); C. KAYSEN &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 44 (1959); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ix (1976). At the same time, there is little
agreement concerning the substance of the term "competition." See, e.g., 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICA-
TION 5-44, 49-50 (3d ed. 1981); McNulty, Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competition,
82 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639-50 (1968); Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Eco-
nomics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1209-
13.
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For an early and well-rdspected
rendition of this view of modem antitrust law, see REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS 5 (1955) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S REPORT]. Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-33 (2d Cir.
1945) ("the old dispensation ... ended with Standard Oil Co. v. United States"); R. BORK,
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the analytical tool for making judgments about the competitive effects of
market conduct and in turn for identifying "unreasonable restraints of
trade."
An orthodox history of early antitrust law provides the common
ground for this consensus about the normative and analytical basis of
modem antitrust doctrine. This standard account usually proceeds as
follows. In the late nineteenth century, growing public concern about
the consolidation of American industry was chronicled in the popular
press, in political party platforms, and on state court dockets.3 Whether
to attack the trusts or merely to defuse civil unrest, Congress passed the
Sherman Act of 1890.4 Unfortunately, neither the Act's language nor
the legislative history "is very illuminating about what specifically is al-
lowed or prohibited."' 5 As a result, some modem commentators accord
the "legislative history of the antitrust laws ... relatively little weight."'6
The language of the statute itself, which follows the general language of
the common law, is viewed as "singularly opaque" and vague, particu-
larly its first section.7 Section one of the Act provides that "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ...is declared to be illegal. ' ' 8 The
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 18-19 (1978) (rule of reason
cases began modem antitrust law).
3. See infra noteg 25-132 and accompanying text. Thoughtful treatments of the.early
history of antitrust law include R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?,
in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965); J.W.
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 245-66 (1977); W. LETWIN, LAW
AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
(1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN
TRADITION (1955); Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section I Analysis: Three Proposals for
Reducing the Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593 (1980) [hereinafter Rethinking Sherman Act];
Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of
Antitrust Policy-Introduction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977) [hereinafter Antitrust Jurispru-
dence]; Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140
(1981); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). For an insightful analysis of
the state antitrust law of this period, see May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Forma-
tive Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 495 (1987).
4. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 CONG. REc. 1120 (1889) (as amended) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1985)); see also Senator Reagan's earlier Bill, S. 3440, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19
CONG. REC. 7512 (1888).
5. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 14-15; see also J. AUERBACH, President
Roosevelt and the Trusts, 175 N. AM. REV. 877, 891 (1902) (describing the legislation as
"crudely drawn, imperfectly considered, hastily enacted .... ")
6. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 15.
7. Id. at 14; R. BORK, supra note 2, at 19-20.
8. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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Supreme Court struggled with the statute for twenty-one years, the fa-
miliar story continues, until they finally got it right by announcing the
"rule of reason" in Standard Oil v. United States. 9 The "literalist" opin-
ions that preceded Standard Oil "reveal some early confusion about the
relationship of § l's prohibition to common law notions of 'restraint of
trade.' "10 Indeed, a "literalist" strategy for interpreting the Sherman
Act appears naive or stupid. How can every contract in restraint of trade
be illegal? Such literalism would outlaw not only price fixing agree-
ments, but also partnership agreements and even simple contracts for the
sale of goods--certainly an unreasonable view of the statute.1" In short,
the "literalist" opinions marked a series of failed attempts to make sense
of enigmatic statutory language.1 2
Is that what the "rule of reason" left behind? Did the old "literal-
ist" majority on the Court really take such naive positions on statutory
interpretation? This Article will show that they did not. Rather, their
conflict with the new "rule of reason" majority centered on fundamental
differences over whether competition should constitute antitrust's only
normative ground. Consequently, the well-settled history of antitrust's
formative years, by focusing primarily on competition, tells only half of
the story.
A strikingly different history emerges from this Article's reformula-
tion of legislative and judicial history. First, the legislative debates
chronicle a conflict between commitments to fostering competition and
commitments to protecting property rights, a tension that produced the
Sherman Act of 1890. From the earliest moments of federal antitrust
history, assuring competitive markets never constituted the sole concern
of legislators or judges.13 Second, it was this tension between competi-
9. 221 U.S. 1 (1911); L. SCHWARTZ, & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY AL-
TERNATIVES 14-15 (5th ed. 1977). For an argument that the "literalists" were proto-price
theorists, see R. BORK, supra note 2, at 22-23. For critiques of that claim, see infra note 22
and sources cited therein.
10. P. AREEDA, supra note 1, at 314.
11. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 351-56 (1897) (White,
J., dissenting).
12. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 19-20.
13. Of course, numerous historical actors have participated in these struggles. The analy-
sis that follows, however, is not interested in finding the authorial intent of particular opinion
writers or opinions, legislators or legislatures, committees or lobbyists. What Senator Sherman
had in mind or how Justice Holmes' antitrust jurisprudence developed is not this Article's
concern. Instead, this Article looks at a series of statements that constituted the discourse of
early antitrust law. This archive houses not only familiar articulations, but also forgotten
statements about antitrust. Neither evolutionary nor chaotic legal doctrine emerges from this
archival study. Rather, the documents put under this new light, the unremarkable debate
transcripts in the Congressional Record, and the court opinions reinvigorated and so recovered
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tion and property, this struggle between two logics, 14 that motivated the
well-known jurisprudential disagreement between the "literalist" and
"rule of reason" factions on the Court. The literalists were not naive;
they developed a scheme based on the familiar categories of direct and
ancillary restraints, a scheme that we continue to use today.15 Compro-
mise with the proponents of the rule of reason was not possible, however,
because the literalists' competition-driven views were profoundly incom-
patible with their colleagues' property- directed commitments. Third and
most surprisingly, the emergence of the rule of reason represented the
triumph of a property-driven logic, not the competition-directed analysis
universally associated with the rule today. 16 Thus, when Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote that the Sherman Act "says nothing about com-
petition,"' 17 he represented the rule of reason's position in the early battle
over the foundations of antitrust law.
This Article's fundamental revision of early antitrust history is im-
portant for several reasons. First, the conventional learning, embedded
in a competition paradigm, excludes half the legislative and doctrinal his-
tory of antitrust's formative years. Redefining the framework to reflect a
tension between competition and property logics brings to light the other
half of this history. Second, the so-called literalist opinions and their rule
of reason successors make more sense reinterpreted within this new his-
report a series of confrontations between opposing logics that have shaped modern antitrust
law. By opening this archive of forgotten struggles and reconstructing the conflicts that pro-
duced early antitrust doctrine, we get a sense of their conditions of possibility. We are able to
define what is unspoken in modern antitrust law, and why.
14. In describing the tension or conflict between "competition" and "property," this Ar-
ticle refers to those concepts as logics, rhetorics, or rhetorical modes. The three labels are
treated as synonymous, each identifying a set of assumptions and beliefs about competition and
property, as well as a system of logical relations among the assumptions and beliefs. They
have been called competition and property paradigms or models as well.
15. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 22-23. For a recent opinion applying a distinction between
direct and ancillary restraints, see Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515,
1522 (1988).
16. The tension between competition and property insinuates a second tension-between
commitments to liberty and equality. See infra notes 51, 255-61 and accompanying text. Un-
til the early 20th century, competition seemed to allow for the illusion of equality.
Why do so many [courts] force upon legislation an academic theory of equality in the
face of practical conditions of inequality? Why do we find a great and learned court
in 1908 taking the long step into the past of dealing with the relation between em-
ployer and employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were individuals-as
if they were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse?
Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1909); see also J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 119-22 (Ogden ed. 1931) (tension between equality and security should be
resolved in favor of security because perfect equality cannot be attained or maintained).
17. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904).
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torical framework.18 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the new
framework allows us to understand modem antitrust law and its relation-
ship to both the Sherman Act and the early cases. 19 Finally, in destabi-
lizing the previously unquestioned link between antitrust and
competition, and in authenticating the importance of property logic to
antitrust law, this Article also raises a new set of questions about the
relationship between competition and the efficiency norm. A full explica-
tion of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article. For now, there
is only the caution that a deep understanding of modem antitrust doc-
trine and scholarship must include consideration of how the tension be-
tween competition and property logics produces the efficiency norm in its
various forms.20
This Article takes as its point of departure the references to policy
conflict articulated in the early legislative debates about the relationship
between competition and combination2 1 and discussed in Robert Bork's
more recent rendition of an antitrust paradox-between free competition
and protection of small business. 22 These two portrayals of competition's
18. This Article's methodology is informed by the work of Michel Foucault, a French
philosopher. See, eg., M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 1972-1977 (C. Gordon ed. 1980); M. FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (A. Sheridan trans. 1979); M. Fou-
CAULT, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEM-
ORY, PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS (Bouchard ed. 1977); M. FOUCAULT,
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (R. How-
ard trans. 1973). M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE
HUMAN SCIENCES (1973). One important implication of Foucault's work is that historians
and other scholars must avoid placing responsibility either simply in the individual or in the
economic. See, eg., C.C. LEMERT & G. GILLAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIAL THEORY AS
TRANSGRESSION 4-20 (1982).
19. See Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. (1989)
(forthcoming) (examining doctrine of vertical restraints as exemplary case of modem antitrust
law).
20. See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509, 512-26 (1980) (observing that the nexus between competition and efficiency is unclear); cf
Peritz, supra note 1, at 1280 (arguing that price theorists have promoted efficiency by inverting
the traditional view that competition implies a constellation of values, one of which is
efficiency).
21. See infra notes 25-132 and accompanying text.
22. This tension between the logics of competition and private property should not be
confused with Robert Bork's claim of an antitrust paradox. His view is that efficiency (a proxy
for laissez-faire) and protectionism are values that constitute a policy at war with itself. R.
BORK, supra note 2, at 6-7.
First, persuasive historical analysis has already shown that Mr. Bork is mistaken about an
impossibly early appearance of the efficiency norm. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 3, at 1154 n.76;
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 249-55 (1985); Lande,
supra note 3, at 82-106; May, supra note 3, at 553-93; Peritz, supra note 1, at 1249 n.252.
Moreover, Mr. Bork's paradox makes no sense analytically. In current vertical restraints
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antagonists-large combinations of capital and "small dealers and wor-
thy men" 23-seem to contradict one another. This Article develops a
concept of property that unravels the contradiction. It shows how seem-
ingly antipodal commitments to large accumulations of capital and to
Jeffersonian entrepreneurialism constitute two modes of a coherent prop-
erty logic.
This new framework-the conflict between competition and prop-
erty-also describes a significantly different mechanism at work in the
production of antitrust doctrine. The position that there have always
been two logics or rhetorics in productive conflict disputes the orthodox
view that competition represents the only positive norm for antitrust and
that combination, small business, or other "anticompetitive" commit-
ments constitute negative values that can or must be subordinated.
This Article proceeds in the following manner. Section I returns to
a recognized but unexplored gap in the Sherman Act's legislative his-
tory-the reticence accompanying the eleventh-hour redrafting of Sena-
tor Sherman's bill and quick passage of what amounted to an entirely
doctrine, for example, efficiency and protectionism seem to be allied values rather than adver-
saries. The "free rider" rationale that Mr. Bork espouses and that the Supreme Court has
embraced in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977) (citing,
inter alia, Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966)), purports to legitimate a manufacturer's imposition of nonprice
restraints on dealers or distributors. Such restraints on intrabrand competition are reasonable
when they increase distributional efficiencies, thereby allowing the manufacturer to compete
more effectively against other manufacturers. The restraints purport to serve distributional
efficiency by encouraging dealers or distributors to promote the manufacturer's products. Re-
straints such as customer and territorial limitations encourage dealers or distributors to pro-
mote a product by protecting their customer base from other dealers. That is, they preclude
dealers from appropriating the value of others' promotional activities. In short, they deter
"free riders." Thus, distributional efficiency is effected by the court's protectionist attitude to-
ward manufacturer's restraints. Though Mr. Bork defines them as antithetical, efficiency and
protectionism go hand in glove down the path of Mr. Bork's "free rider" analysis. For excel-
lent critiques of the "free rider" rationale within the context of resale price maintenance, see
Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1131-42 (1986); Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law:
An Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 IOWA L. REV. 981, 984-86
(1982); Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a Per Se Rule Against Verti-
cal Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1492-94 (1983).
Not only does Mr. Bork's paradox make no sense, but the traditional antitrust value of
Jeffersonian entrepreneurialism, or protectionism according to Mr. Bork, is produced by the
interplay of competition and property logics, not by anti-efficiency sentiments. See Peritz,
supra note 19.
Finally, the norm of efficiency as it has appeared in antitrust doctrine is a product of the
fundamental conflict between the logics of property and competition. For a discussion of effi-
ciency within the context of the "free rider" rationale for vertical restraints on distribution, see
id. For a full analysis of the efficiency norm's production, see id.
23. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 338 (1897).
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new piece of legislation. This gap in the Congressional Record is emblem-
atic of the tension between competition and property. Next, section II
explains how the Court's literalist majority in the early antitrust cases
applied a logic of competition to interpret the Sherman Act. Section III
shows how the Court's shift to a "rule of reason" in Standard Oil v.
United States2 4 represented victory for the new majority's property logic.
Finally, section IV maps the structure and dynamics of early antitrust
history.
I. The Legislative Debates: Industrial Liberty and Fair Price
To set the context for the narrative that follows, a brief account of
what happened in the congressional debates is appropriate. For more
than two years, the Senate and the House debated a bill, originally intro-
duced in 1888 with the following operative language: "Be it enacted...
that all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations...
made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition...
or which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer ... are hereby de-
clared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void .... -25 While a
number of amendments were offered and discussed, most of the congres-
sional debate centered on three issues: the proper constitutional reach of
congressional authority under the commerce clause, an explicit labor ex-
emption, and the desirability of state court jurisdiction.26 Eventually, the
1888 bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for revision. Six
days after the 1888 bill's referral, Committee Chairman Edmunds intro-
duced an amended bill that was quite different from its predecessor. In
place of the 1888 language of "full and free competition" and "cost to the
consumer," the 1890 Bill substituted "contract... in restraint of trade or
commerce," and "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... trade or
commerce. ' 27 The 1890 Bill was passed in a matter of days. Despite
these changes, however, we now take for granted that there are, or
should be, no significant differences between the two versions. We as-
sume that proper antitrust policy is based on free competition and its
connection to consumer prices, even though the language referring to
these policies was jettisoned in the final bill. Neither logic nor history,
24. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
25. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., 20 CONG. REc. 1120 (1889) (as amended); S. 3440,
50th Cong., 2d Sess.,19 CONG. Rc. '7512 (1888) (as amended).
26. Hans Thorelli agrees with this assessment. See H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 177-
210.
27. S. 1, 51st Cong., Ist Sess., 21 CONG. REC. 2901 (1890); see S. 3445, 50th Cong., 2d
Sess., 20 CONG. REc. 1120 (1889); see also, S.3440, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 7512
(1888) (predecessor bill).
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however, compels this conclusion. This section explains why the Sher-
man Act cannot be viewed simply as a mandate for free competition and
consumer sovereignty. 28
A. The Competition Logic of Industrial Liberty
Given the nexus of modem antitrust doctrine with competition and
given the wealth of scholarship on the Act's legislative history cor-
roborating that nexus, we would expect to find numerous statements con-
cerning competition in the floor debates about Senator Sherman's Bill.
Following is a sampling of references to competition in the Congressional
Record. Senator Sherman himself stated:
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the
aid of the courts of the United States... in dealing with combinations
that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens .... It is the
right of every man to work, labor, and produce in any lawful voca-
tion .... This is industrial liberty and lies at the foundation of the
equality of all rights and privileges....
The sole object of ... [a trust] is to make competition impossible.
It can control the market, raise or lower prices, as will best promote its
selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and break down
competition and advance prices at will where competition does not ex-
ist. Its governing motive is to increase the profits of the parties com-
posing it. The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition, compels
it to disregard the interest of the consumer. 29
Although Senator Sherman's references to competition sound famil-
iar, his use of the term depended on a set of assumptions and beliefs that
have grown unfamiliar to us in recent years. In talking about "full and
free competition," Senator-Sherman and others made frequent reference
to something called "industrial liberty."' 30 Although modern readers
might understand this term to mean freedom from governmental regula-
tion or other market intervention, Senator Sherman and his contempo-
raries were concerned with another kind of power. Their attentions
focused on "combinations of capital" that "make competition impossi-
ble."' 31 Such market power "advance[d] the cost to the consumer" 32 by
28. The clearest example of an attempt to connect free competition and consumer welfare
is R. BORK, supra note 2, at 66.
29. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
30. Id.
31. Id.; 21 CONG. REc. 1768 (1890) (Sen. George: extorted wealth); 21 CONG. REC. 2572
(1890) (Sen. Teller: predatory pricing).
The term "combination" was used to represent a wide range of agreements, trusts, corpo-
rate holding companies, and secret understandings. There were "loose" combinations, such as
agreements to agree on price, and "tight" combinations, such as the Standard Oil Trust.
Although today we tend to use the term less inclusively, this Article's use of the term will
follow the more relaxed usage of the congressional debates. "Combination" will mean any
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the "ultimate fixing of a price."'33 The interest of the public was safe only
so long as competition remained free of such market power.34 In our
terms, the primary strategy of Sherman and others was to limit market
power and thereby to prevent monopoly pricing; their ultimate goal was
to enhance the consumer's well-being.
While "full and free competition" may have been seen as the best
way to protect consumers, the related notion of "industrial liberty" signi-
fied a broader set of assumptions and beliefs, which captured the congres-
sional imagination. As Senator Sherman's statement above indicates,
industrial liberty was valued not only for its potential downward push on
prices. Senator Teller expressed as much when he said, "I do not believe
that the great object in life is to make everything cheap."' 35 Industrial
liberty also embodied a sense of the public as competitors and employees
of the new large combinations of capital, whose power rendered "the
boasted liberty of the citizen... a myth."' 36 Thus, in the House debate,
Representative Mason pointed out that even if "trusts have made prod-
ucts cheaper, . . . [they] have destroyed legitimate competition." '37
Senator Reagan first introduced his own antitrust bill38 and later
offered several amendments to Sherman's bill 39 to assure a cause of ac-
tion for the small competitors injured by large combinations of capital-
a realistic "remedy for the great mass of people." 4 Industrial liberty
(whether enjoyed by capital or labor) was thought to require rivalrous
marketplace participants, and perhaps some supervision and control of
industries characterized by firms with large cumulations of assets. In
sum, the idea of industrial liberty demanded conditions of rough compet-
private agreement producing a cartel, pooling arrangement, trust, or merger. In contrast,
"cartel," "pooling arrangement," "trust," and "merger" are used in their narrow senses.
32. S. 3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 8483 (1888) (Sen. Sherman's original
bill).
33. 21 CONG REc. 137 (1889) (statement of Sen. Turpie); cf Kennedy, The Role of Law
in Economic Thought, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 944 (1985) (describing the relationship between
classical economic and legal thought).
34. 21 CONG. REc. 2458 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman, quoting from Craft v. McCo-
noughy, 79 11. 346, 350 (1875)); see also 20 CONG. REc. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones)
(these combinations of capital could "plunder the public").
35. 20 CONG. Rc. 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Teller); 21 CONG. REc. 2726 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Edmunds) (the "great monopolies ... command everybody, laborer, con-
sumer, producer, and everybody else.").
36. 21 CONG. REc. 2561 (1890) (statement of Sen. Teller).
37. 21 CONG. REc. 4100 (1890) (statement of Rep. Mason).
38. S. 3440, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 CONG. REC. 7512 (1888).
39. See, eg., 21 CONG. REc. 2597 (1890).
40. I d at 3146.
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itive equality.41
In congressional debates, a distinction was drawn between industrial
liberty and unrestrained competition, the belief being that some competi-
tion impinges on industrial liberty. For example, in the heated debate
just prior to the 1888 bill's referral to committee and radical redrafting,
Senator Platt articulated a tension between industrial liberty and that
bill's language of free competition; he noted that the "bill proceeds upon
the false assumption that all competition is beneficent to the country
... 42 Later, in House debate over the Conference Report on the 1890
bill as enacted, Representative Stewart stated his understanding of the
new language: "It is just as necessary to restrict competition as it is to
restrict combination . . . . 43 Thus, the congressmen shared the belief
that "unrestrained competition" is not free competition because it dimin-
ishes industrial liberty. Rather, "free and fair competition" was seen as
the victim of both unrestricted competition and unrestricted combina-
tion. The trusts were seen as embodying the forces of both unrestricted
extremes.
The concern for consumer and producer liberty also implicated
political liberty. For example, Senator Jones argued that if the trusts
were allowed to continue, "the boasted liberty of the citizen is a myth...
and our Government is a farce and a fraud." 44 Senator Sherman echoed
these sentiments in stating that industrial liberty is "the foundation of the
equality of all rights and privileges."'45 He believed that rough competi-
tive equality was important not only for economic or vocational liberty,
but for political liberty in a democratic society as well.
They had monopolies and mortmains of old, but never before such
giants as in our day. You must heed their appeal or be ready for the
socialist, the communist, and the nihilist. Society is now disturbed by
forces never felt before.
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb so-
cial order, and among them all none is more threatening than the ine-
41. See, e.g., id. at 2457 (statement of Sen. Sherman, arguing that a "corporation... [is]
an artificial person without fear of death, without a soul to save or body to punish; but if other
corporations can be formed on equal terms a monopoly is impossible."). For a discussion of
the impulse toward equality, see infra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
42. 21 CONG. REc. 2729 (1890) (statement of Sen. Platt).
43. Id. at 5956 (statement of Rep. Stewart).
44. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890); see, e.g., R. ELY, PROBLEMS OF TODAY: A DISCUSSION
OF PROTECTIVE TARIFFS, TAXATION, AND MONOPOLIES 126 (2d ed. 1890) (asserting that
honest government and monopoly were not compatible); infra text accompanying note 100.
45. 21 CONG. REC. 1457 (1890); cf F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 25 (1944) (argu-
ing that political freedom is dependent upon economic freedom); Stigler, Wealth, and Possibly
Liberty, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 213, 214-15 (1978) (analyzing personal liberty in terms of economic
endowment).
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quality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within
a single generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combi-
nations to control production and trade' and to break down
competition. 46
Given the commitment to industrial liberty and the identification of
trusts as the threat to it, the solution seemed simple enough. Whether by
forfeiture of assets to the government47 or by private treble damage ac-
tions, political power in the form of antitrust legislation could protect the
natural process of competition from the market power of unnatural com-
binations of capital.4 8 This seemingly rational and natural alignment of
legislation and competition, however, remained problematic even after
the 1890 Bill's passage,49 not because of concern over governmental in-
tervention into some sacred arena called "the competitive market,' 50 but
because of deep convictions about something else. The alliance between
political power and competition was undercut by the imaginative force
and normative appeal of something called "fair price."
The desire to assure fair prices was not the only source of tension in
the relationship between industrial liberty and private agreements such
as trusts and price fixing cartels. Another area of conflict was over the
role of government in ensuring industrial liberty. On the one hand, in-
dustrial liberty was taken to mean rough competitive equality. In this
sense, it called for the restraint of trusts and other powerful combina-
tions. Thus, governmental action to dissolve private agreements in re-
straint of competition was a legitimate way to achieve industrial liberty.
This impulse to equalize market power constituted a movement toward
the ideal of perfect competition. At the same time, this impulse gener-
ated the ideal's demise. Under this view industrial liberty could suggest
that private agreements were a means of achieving countervailing power
46. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
47. Section six of the 1890 Bill, as enacted, afforded a brutal weapon for equalizing com-
petition by seizing the offending firms' property upon finding a section one violation. S. 1, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess., § 6, 21 CONG. REc. 2901 (1890). It stated that any property
owned... by any combination... and being in the course of transportation from one
State to another... shall be forfeited to the United States, and may be seized and
condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure,
and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (Supp. IV 1986); see also 21 CONG. REc. 125 (1889) (Sen. Turpie
offering resolution calling for seizure of trust goods).
48. Compare the ascendent 19th century view of corporations as natural organic groups.
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173,
178-83 (1985).
49. 21 CONG. REc. 6208 (1890) (Senate concurring in the SECOND CONFERENCE RE-
PORT); 21 CONG. REc. 6314 (1890) (House adopting SECOND CONFERENCE REPORT).
50. Indeed, markets were seen as uniformly uncompetitive. See 21 CONG. REc. 2726-27
(1890).
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against trusts or cartels. 5' Thus, this impulse toward competitive equal-
ity could not provide an indisputable basis for deciding whether a private
agreement in restraint of competition was a social evil.
On the other hand, industrial liberty was also taken to mean the
freedom to enter into contracts to further one's own interests. This lais-
sez-faire view of market conduct, unspoken in the debates, was founded
in the social value of liberty. In this sense, industrial liberty involved
freedom from political power and therefore, freedom from government
dissolution of private agreements. Thus, industrial liberty could also
mean enforcing private agreements, whether or not they restrained
competition.
This tension in the notion of industrial liberty can be understood in
two ways. First, "liberty" can mean either freedom from governmental
power or freedom from market power. These views, with their radically
different concerns, employed conflicting strategies to achieve their goals.
The freedom from government power view required the government to
enforce private agreements, whether or not they restrained competition.
In contrast, where the goal was freedom from market power, the govern-
ment was to intervene to enjoin private agreements that restrained com-
petition. Second, the tension in industrial liberty can be understood in
terms of two impulses--one toward equality and perfect competition and
the other toward liberty and free competition (or laissez-faire competi-
tion). This tension between equality and liberty is developed more fully
in the course of this study and is introduced at this juncture for the lim-
ited purpose of unpacking the notion of industrial liberty.
In spite of the tension, these two sides of industrial liberty did share
one important tenet. For entirely different reasons, both views held that
one benefit of industrial liberty was "fair price." Those who argued for
equalization of market power called for governmental intervention to dis-
solve private agreements, such as trusts or price fixing cartels, in order to
reinstate the "full and free competition" necessary to produce fair
prices.5 2 Those who claimed the liberty to enter into private agreements
in restraint of competition characterized their combinations as contracts
51. A modem analogue of "industrial liberty" and its impulse toward equality is the
notion of "workable competition," described as a pragmatic tool for judging whether a market
is competitive. See, e.g., Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REV. 241, 253-56 (1940); Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and Monopoly,
64 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108-12 (1955). Whereas the ideals of perfect competition and perfect
monopoly are purely analytic tools rather than desirable and attainable market conditions,
"workable competition" rather than "workable monopoly" is the appropriate antitrust goal.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 320-39; P. AREEDA, supra note 1, at 40.
52. See, e.g., infra text at note 54.
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to charge fair prices in the face of ruinous competition.53 Thus, each side
of the industrial liberty tension claimed fair price as its own product.
B. The Property Logic of Fair Price
Both views of industrial liberty-freedom from market power and
freedom from government power-had many proponents at the time.
Yet, the congressional speeches employing the rhetoric of industrial lib-
erty championed only the freedom from market power view. These
speeches called for governmental intervention to dissolve trusts and other
private agreements in restraint of competition. But other speeches by
freedom from market power advocates deployed a very different form of
argument. For example, Senator George stated:
These trusts and combinations are great wrongs to the people ....
They increase beyond reason the cost of the necessaries of life and busi-
ness and they decrease the cost of the raw material, the farm products
of the country. They regulate prices at their will .... They aggregate
to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion .... Then making
this extorted wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortu-
nate victims.., they are fast producing that condition in our people in
which the great mass of them are the servitors of those who have this
aggregated wealth at their command. 54
Senator Jones reiterated the negative impact of trusts on the public:
"These commercial monsters called trusts ... [are] preying upon every
industry, and by their unholy combinations robbing their victims, the
general public ... .,,s5 Senator Turpie agreed: "The conspirators of the
trust.., are hunting the prey, dividing the spoil in every market.... [If
they] pirate upon the earnings of the people, justice may... strike down
the offense and the offenders." 56
Moreover, those speeches seeking enforcement of private agree-
ments advanced the very same logic, founded in the notions of "fair
profit" or "fair return." The following excerpts are examples of speeches
using this logic. Senator Platt stated:
The true theory of this matter is that prices should be just and reason-
able and fair, that prices ... should be such as will render a fair return
to all persons engaged in its production, a fair profit on capital, on
labor, and on everything else that enters into its production. ...
[E]very man in business ... has a right, a legal and a moral right, to
obtain a fair profit upon his business and his work; and if he is driven
by fierce competition to a spot where his business is unremunerative, I
believe it is his right to combine for the purpose of raising prices until
53. See, e.g., infra text at note 57.
54. 21 CONG. Rc. 1768 (1890) (statement of Sen. George).
55. 20 CONG. R c. 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones).
56. 21 CONG. REc. 137 (1889) (statement of Sen. Turpie).
January 1989]
they shall be fair and remunerative. 57
Representative Stewart also emphasized a notion of fair return on
investment:
A rate war between railroads is absolutely injurious to the community.
Why, it cannot be otherwise. In the first place the doctrine of fair play
requires, and everybody concedes, that the railroads should have a just
compensation for their services. We ought not to ask them to do any-
thing for less than will pay the interest on the investment and the run-
ning expenses. That is only reasonable and fair.58
Representative Morse echoed these concerns for a fair price:
[If this Bill] proposes to deny to manufacturers and merchants the
right to control the price at which their goods shall be sold, the right to
say they shall not enter into ruinous competition, the right to exact a
fair and living profit on the sale of their goods by the merchant who
handles them, it will be unwise legislation and injurious to the manu-
facturer, to the merchant, to the consumer, and the whole people, and
strike a blow at the business interests of the country, because it will
violate a sound business principle, to "live and let live."'59
These speeches representing the freedom from government view il-
lustrate the workings of a logic very different from the competition rheto-
ric of industrial liberty. They describe the contours of a property
rhetoric whose foundation is the notion of a "fair profit" or "fair return."
Briefly, the argument is as follows: It is an independent social good that
those who work, those who put their labor or capital into the market,
should get a fair return on their input. This social good benefits both
producers and consumers. "Fair profit" or "fair return" is a social good
that the government should enforce, whether the evil be competition or
combination and whether the harm be low profits or high prices. It is a
social good to be enforced in much the same way that one's possession of
property is protected from theft or extortion.
Like the competition rhetoric of industrial liberty, the property rhet-
oric of fair price embodied a tension. Fair price could be characterized
as the consequence of competition as well as the consequence of combi-
nation. The following analysis of fair price focuses on two excerpts from
the Congressional Record to develop the implications of this property
logic seeking to argue the benefits of private agreements in restraint of
competition: first, Representative Stewart's description of the grand
struggle between competition and combination;60 second, the concerns of
57. Id. at 2720-30 (1890) (statement of Sen. Platt).
58. Id. at 5957 (statement of Rep. Stewart).
59. Id. at 5954 (statement of Rep. Morse).
60. 21 CONG. REC. 5956 (1890) (FIRST CONFERENCE REPORT); see also id. at 5954
(statement of Rep. Morse).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
RULE OF REASON
Representative Morse and Senator Platt that the new antitrust law not
deny the legal and moral (property) right to obtain a fair profit.61
Representative Stewart described competition and combination as
"two great forces... contending for ... mastery."' 62 They "are correc-
tives of each other, and both ought to exist. Both ought to be under
restraint. ' 63 Although competition was the acknowledged social good to
be protected by restraining combinations of capital, Representative Stew-
art believed that "[ilt is just as necessary to restrict competition as it is to
restrict combination ....
Representative Stewart continued his speech about these "two great
forces" by offering two diverse examples of the need to allow some com-
bination. First, he observed that there was "hardly a class in the country
today that.., is not in some form of combination. ' 65 "[W]here competi-
tion is excessive and becoming destructive ... the laborer is justified in
entering into combinations for self-protection." 66 In other words, when
market conditions have destroyed the value of labor, and when market
price has fallen below fair return, a combination can legitimately restore
the fair and natural price to commodities or services. 67
61. Id. at 5954; id at 2730 (Statement of Sen. Platt).
62. Id at 5956 (FIRsT CONFERENCE REPORT).
63. Id
64. Id Nonetheless, the image of combinations as a second force contending against the
natural force of competition was seen as a problematic representation of nature, markets or
society. There were at least two reasons for this. First, combinations were thought to effect
great changes in established social and economic relationships. Second, the very presence of
combinations suggested that there was a second natural tendency in addition to the natural
tendency to compete. Were trusts "monsters" endangering the natural competitive state of
markets, or were they evidence of a natural tendency to combine? Were they unnatural and to
be restrained, or natural and perhaps beneficial? Both views of combination were articulated
in the popular press and in scholarly writing of the times. Some opponents of trusts argued for
governmental regulation and even public ownership, while proponents expressed faith in the
notion of potential competition. See generally H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 109-32. These
responses to the problem of how to characterize the appearance of large combination are de-
scribed in detail infra, text accompanying notes 103-32, in the context of classical economic
and legal theory. For now, the tension between these tendencies to compete and to combine are
presented as a context for describing the following excerpts about combinations as statements
about the property logic of fair return or fair price.
65. 21 CONG. REc. 5956 (1890) (statement of Rep. Stewart).
66. Id
67. There is a striking similarity to modern predatory pricing doctrine, founded in the
cost accounting comparison of price to some measure of cost-whether marginal, average vari-
able, or just average. The 19th century baseline of labor value has been expanded into a labor-
and-capital based minimum for exchange value. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 113-19 (1986); Brodley, The Goals of Antitrust-Pre-Trial Hearing No. 1. A
Verbatim Account of an Imagined Proceeding, 28 ANTrrRUST BULL. 823, 826, 835-38 (1983)
(setting out variants of cost-based predatory pricing doctrine); Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pric-
ing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv.
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Representative Stewart's second example of the need to allow some
combination appears somewhat later in the debates, when the focus had
shifted to the relationship between the 1890 Antitrust Bill and the re-
cently enacted Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). The ICA saved the rail-
roads from self-inflicted ruinous competition, by permitting them to form
rate associations. 68 The ICA called for just and reasonable charges, pro-
scribed territorial discrimination, and prohibited pooling. In response to
Representative Bland's skepticism about the Antitrust Bill's effectiveness
in controlling railroad combinations and rate agreements, 69 Representa-
tive Stewart argued that, whichever statute applied, "the doctrine of fair
play requires . . .just compensation. ' 70 "What is the objection, if the
rate is just and reasonable?" 71 In other words, both the ICA and the
proposed Antitrust Bill should be interpreted to permit railroads to agree
on rates that would stop rate wars and allow them to "pay the interest on
the investment and the running expenses." '72
Representative Stewart's references to "just compensation" and to
covering interest and expenses echoed the rationale in earlier rate regula-
tion cases, such as Munn v. Illinois.73 Thirteen years earlier, Munn had
addressed the fourteenth amendment due process question of "taking"
private property in the public interest. The Illinois statute under scru-
tiny was one of the numerous "Granger laws" passed in the agricultural
states of the Midwest and West to regulate the warehousing and trans-
portation of grain. 74 The particular statute in Munn defined grain eleva-
tors as public warehouses and established maximum rates for storing
grain. The crucial issue in the case involved the power of state govern-
ment to regulate the owners' return on their business, thereby trumping
private agreements regarding price and limiting the investment return on
private property.7" Munn and similar rate regulation cases stand for the
proposition that constitutional protection of property demands only that
738, 741-42 (1981) (describing economic theories and judicial applications of predatory
pricing).
68. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); 21 CONG. REC. 5957
(1890).
69. 21 CONG. REc. 5953, 5957 (1890); cf Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971) (modeling firms as buyers in a market for government regulation).
70. 21 CONG. REC. 5957 (1890).
71. Id. at 5951.
72. Id. at 5957.
73. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
74. See, e.g., S. BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL OR-
GANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS, 1870-1880, at
123, 159, 166, 179, 194 (1913). All the "Granger" cases are in volume 94 of the United States
Reports.
75. 94 U.S. at 114.
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an investor be able to receive a certain minimum fair profit and not the
maximum profit possible through private agreement.76
The rationale of Representative Stewart's comments parallels the
reasoning in these rate cases: just compensation to railroads and to labor
requires some minimum rate of return. In all of these cases, some mini-
mum protection of property rights "is only reasonable and fair."'77 Stew-
art's statements emphasize the value of combinations insofar as they
could secure for the producer a fair profit or fair return on property,
whether that return derives from capital or labor.78 Moreover, it is clear
that a fair return to the producer entails a fair price to the consumer-no
more and no less.
In the same debate, Representative Morse recapitulated the view
that combination is a legitimate means for assuring a fair return on prop-
erty. He asserted that the Bill would destroy the " 'contract system' of
selling goods, the intention of which is to fix a fair and living profit to the
merchant . . . . 79 The reference here is to resale price maintenance (a
manufacturer's setting of retail prices).80 Whatever our own view of a
76. Regarding state regulation of rates and the issue of just compensation, see, for exam-
ple, Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1923) (stating that there is no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated
in highly profitable enterprises); Missouri ex rel Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (describing methodology for
determining a fair return on investment); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898) (stating
that a company is entitled to no more than a fair return upon the value of that which it
employs for the public convenience).
77. 21 CONG. Rc. 5957 (1890).
78. For a recent analysis of constitutional law doctrine regarding fair price, see Siegel,
Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Dis-
tinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1 (1986).
79. 21 CONG. Rc. 5954 (1890).
80. In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act, which
granted state fair trade statutes an exemption from the federal antitrust laws. Act of Aug. 17,
1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1985)). In 1952, the Mc-
Guire Act was passed to strengthen the fair trade statutes, by allowing state sanctioned resale
price maintenance, whether or not retailers agreed with the manufacturer. These provisions
were repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat.
801. The position of Chicago School adherents is that vertical price restraints should not be
illegal per se. Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Co., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (holding nevertheless that
vertical price restraints remain illegal per se). They would apply a "rule of reason." See, e.g.,
Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price Maintenance: A "'Rule of Reason" Approach, 14
ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. REv. 13, 13 (1982) (arguing that vertical price restraints should not
be illegal per se); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 6, 31-32 (1981). For some reactions in trade journals
against arguments to loosen the per se illegality of resale price maintenance, see, for example,
Pertschuk & Correia, Resale Price Maintenance-Why the Per Se Rule Should be Enforced, 15
NAT. J. 1201, 1201-02 (1983); Taylor, Congress Objects as Administration Seeks Relaxing of
"Vertical Price-Fixing" Ban, Wall St. J., May 16, 1983, at 12, col. 1. For scholarly critiques,
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price-fixing manufacturer's intent,81 the value articulated is consistent
with Representative Stewart's argument for allowing some combina-
tion-that is, protecting the value of one's property from competition,
whether that property takes the form of labor, rolling stock, manufac-
turer's goods, or retailer's goodwill.
Senator Platt and some of his colleagues expressed a fear that the
Bill would make all agreements between competitors illegal and would
result in the "brutal warfare" of "unrestricted competition. '8 2 In an ear-
lier Senate debate over the 1888 Bill, Senator Platt stated that:
every man in business... has a right, a legal and moral right, to obtain
a fair profit upon his business and his work; and if he is driven by fierce
competition to a spot where his business is unremunerative, I believe it
is his right to combine for the purpose of raising prices until they shall
be fair and remunerative.8 3
Although no speaker argued against "breaking up the great monop-
olies which get hold of the whole of a particular business or production
in the country and are enabled, therefore, to command everybody, la-
borer, consumer, producer, and everybody else,"'84 a number of congress-
men agreed that unrestrained competition was the culprit. Senator Platt,
for example, declared that "the great monopolies of this country are
every one of them built upon the graves of weaker competitors that have
been forced to their death by remorseless competition."8 5 In the
animated debate just prior to the introduction of the 1890 Bill, Senator
Platt summarized this position:
The true theory of this matter is that prices should be just and reason-
able and fair, that prices, no matter who is the producer or what the
article, should be such as will render a fair return to all persons en-
gaged in its production, a fair profit on capital, on labor, and on every-
thing else that enters into its production. 86
These notions of fair return or fair profit appear alien in statements
see Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy,
98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 990-1002 (1985); supra note 22 and sources cited therein.
81. Ever since the 1911 Supreme Court decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1911), there had been little question that vertical price
fixing was illegal per se. That is, the plaintiff need not show purpose, power, or competitive
effects. Then, in 1977, the Court's decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977), raised some questions regarding the continuing viability of a per se
standard for vertical price fixing, though the case involved nonprice restraints, all of which
were adjudicated under the "rule of reason." It was Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Co., 465 U.S. 752
(1984), that put those questions to rest.
82. 21 CONG. REC. 2729 (1890).
83. Id. at 2730.
84. Id. at 2726 (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
85. Id. at 2729 (statement of Sen. Platt).
86. Id. Underlying this theory is a problematic image of "natural" markets populated by
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about competition. In contrast, they comfortably inhabit statements
about protecting the value of one's property-whether labor, rolling
stock, manufacturer's goods, or retailer's goodwill. With this rehearsal
of the tension between competition and property as an epilogue, debate
on the 1888 Bill ended.
C. Property Logic and the Language of the Common Law
Six days after the debate's closure, Senator Edmunds introduced a
new bill. The 1890 Bill replaced the previous Bill's language of "free
competition" and "cost to the consumer" with language of the common
law-"restraint of trade or commerce" and "monopolize." 87 One week
after the new Bill's introduction, after only a few hours of floor debate,
both Houses quickly passed the new Sherman Act.88 Aside from Con-
gress' well-known concerns about the earlier Bill's constitutionality, 9
what other significance can be attributed to the radical change in
language?
There is much evidence to suggest that Congress intended to codify
the common-law meaning of the terms used in the new Bill. For exam-
ple, Senator Hoar, who first asked that the new Bill be taken up by the
full Senate, immediately expressed hope for an early vote. His reason for
anticipating such expedited treatment of an entirely new Bill was that the
Bill was already "well understood." 90 The obvious implication of this
assertion is that much off-the-record negotiation and compromise had
accompanied the new Bill and had already familiarized everyone with the
Bill's content. Beyond this familiarity with the Bill's language, however,
there was also a common ground for the Senators' understanding of the
new Bill's language. Apparently, it was taken for granted that there was
a common law that would provide the groundwork for the development
of a federal common law of monopoly and restraints of trade.91 This
assumption is suggested in Senator Hoar's statement in the Congressional
individuals-by equally powerful laborers and capitalists. See, e.g., id. at 2727 (statement of
Sen. Edmunds).
87. Id at 2901 (1890) (Chief Clerk reading substitute bill reported by the Committee on
the Judiciary); id at 3146, 3148, 3152 (monopoly "a technical term known to the common
law").
88. Id. at 3153 (Senate passage, April 8, 1890); id. at 6314 (House passage, June 20,
1890). The delay in House action was due to an eleventh-hour attempt to include a specific
reference in section one to transportation, in order to assure the Bill's priority over the Inter-
state Commerce Act. Id. at 4088-104, 5950-61, 5981-83, 6312-14.
89. Id. at 3148 (statement of Sen. Edmunds); H. R. REP. No. 1707, 51st cong.j 1st Sess. 1
(1890) (report of the House Judiciary Committee).
90. 21 CONG. REc. 3145 (1890).
91. See id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("I do not mean to say that [the committee]
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Record: "We have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law... and
have clothed the United States courts with authority to enforce that doc-
trine .... ,92 Senator Edmunds later added that the Committee took the
new Bill's language-"monopolize," for example-"out of terms that
were well known to the law already."' 93 In response to a question about
an ingenious rancher's monopoly of short-horn cattle trade with Mexico,
Senator Edmunds stated, "Anybody who knows the meaning of the word
'monopoly,' as the courts apply it, would not apply it to such a person at
all . . . . 94 He continued:
"[M]onopoly" is a technical term known to the common law .... [A]
man who merely by superior skill and intelligence ... got the whole
business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a
monopolist .... [Monopoly] involved something like the use of means
which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competi-
tion .... 95
This common-law "meaning" upon which Congress seemed to rely
came from the states96 or from sources outside the United States, as there
was no federal common law of monopoly or restraints of trade prior to
the Sherman Act.97 Under the common law developed in the several
states, price fixing agreements were generally void and unenforceable,
though there were a few notable exceptions.98 State governments at-
tacked some of the more visible trusts, typically arguing that their corpo-
rate charters did not permit the formation of such trusts. 99 In one
common-law case, the chief justice of the Michigan Supreme Court ven-
tured even farther: "Monopoly in trade or in any kind of business in this
country is odious to our form of government .... Its tendency is...
stated what the signification was, but I became satisfied that they were right and that the word
'monopoly' is a merely technical term which has a clear and legal signification.").
92. Id. at 3146, 3152.
93. Id. at 3148.
94. Id. at 3151 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). It is interesting to note that this floor
debate seemed to recognize a distinction between monopoly and monopolize-something that
has been central to section two doctrine. The distinction has been made between a condition of
monopoly and acts of monopolization. That is, the courts have called for some conduct evi-
dencing predatory intent. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236
F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964) (Wyzanski, J.), aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
95. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890). The example given of unfair means is merger-"the
buying up of all other persons engaged in the same business." Id.
96. For thoughtful treatments of the state antitrust law context, see H. THORELLI, supra
note 3, at 155-63; May, supra note 3.
97. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 36-37-
98. See, e.g., Central Shade-Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353, 364, 9 N.E. 629, 631
(1887).
99. Id., 9 N.E. at 630.
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destructive of free institutions, and repugnant to the instincts of a free
people, and contrary to the whole scope and spirit of the federal
Constitution."o
In contrast to the states' treatment of private agreements in restraint
of competition, the most recent and best known case under the British
common law espoused a radically different view. In Mogul Steamship Co.
v. McGregor, Gow & Co., a "shipping conference" or cartel was not dis-
solved, even though it financed a "fighting ship" to carry cargo at prices
that "would not repay a shipowner for his adventure."10 1 Although
Lord Bowen declared that "intentionally to do that which is calculated
... to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other
person's property or trade, is actionable," this agreement was not a com-
mon-law restraint of trade because it did "nothing more.., than pursue
to the bitter end a war of competition ... ."x2 Thus, the British court
protected the freedom to enter into private agreements in restraint of
competition, characterizing the agreement as an acceptable form of
competition.
Though there is no record of how these and other statements formu-
lating restraints of trade doctrine engaged the imaginations of individual
congressmen, a great deal can be said about what they took for granted
concerning classical legal doctrine and economics. From a sketch of the
contours of classical economics and then classical contracts and property
doctrine, a good likeness (for our limited purposes) of the shared cultural
context of the Fifty-First Congress emerges. That cultural context in-
cluded some sense 10 3 of monopolies and restraints of trade. Perhaps
100. Richardson v. Buhl & Alger,- 77 Mich. 632, 658, 43 N.W. 1102, 1110 (1889).
101. 23 Q.B.D. 598, 612 (1889), aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25.
102. Id. at 614-19. Taking a middle ground of sorts, the opinion later confided that a
party to the agreement could challenge it. Id. at 620. The court deemed the agreement not
void, but rather unenforceable. Id. at 632.
103. The classical economists were the strongest supporters of the view that the tendency
to compete was natural and that competitive markets were inevitable. See, e.g., A. WALKER,
THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. EMBRACING THE LAWS
OF TRADE, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE (1875); F. WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1837); cf 3 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION
1865-1918 359-89 (1949) (demonstrating that there was a substantial relationship between the
classical economists' work and the public perceptions of the times); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL
DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1860-1915, at 145 (1949) (observing that Francis Way-
land's book was the most popular college textbook in political economy during the period).
The neoclassicists asserted that, although markets were not competitive, there was always
potential competition lurking in the wings. Andrew Carnegie articulated this view most sub-
limely. See Carnegie, The Bugaboo of Trusts, 148 N. AM. REV. 141, 150 (1889). Scholarly
renditions of the neoclassical position include J.B. CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THE-
ORY viii (1907); Giddings, The Persistence of Competition, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 62, 65 (1887);
Gunton, The Economic and SocialAspects of Trusts, 3 POL. SC. Q. 385, 385-408 (1888). For a
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most salient here, it also included an account of the unnatural appear-
ance of monopolies and restraints of trade in an otherwise lawfully and
naturally competitive marketplace.
A naturalistic sense of lawfulness and rationality constituted the
foundation of nineteenth century discourse, whether scientific, economic,
or legal. Hence, when Representative Stewart spoke of "two great forces
working in human society,"' 1  he imagined competition and combination
as two lawful and rational agencies contending with one another. This
claim that there might be two natural tendencies-one to compete and
the other to combine-rather than an unrivaled tendency to compete,
was a recent development prompted by the changing face of American
industry and labor. 0 5 The nineteenth century belief in natural law and
its rationality animated a desire to characterize the tendency to combine
as natural and rational, because the alternative-asserting the unnatural-
ness of the widespread practice of combination-would call into question
the very belief in natural law and its rationality. At the same time, a
profound ambivalence gripped the nineteenth century attitude toward
combinations. The success of such combinations was at odds with classi-
cal legal and economic doctrines, which espoused the inevitability of
competition.10 6 Under these doctrines, if only the tendency to compete
direct critique of this view, see Bullock, The Trusts and Public Policy, 87 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 737, 742 (1901) ("There can be no potential competition when actual competition
is hopeless.").
The New School of Economics was an American response to the foregoing views of mar-
kets as inevitably competitive. Although the adherents to this school had differing solutions,
they all agreed that the problem was the inevitability of combination. See, e.g., A. HADLEY,
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION-ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 124 (1885); Andrews, Trusts
According to Official Investigations, 3 Q.J. ECON. 117 (1889); Clark, The Limits of Competition,
2 POL. ScI. Q. 45 (1887). Ultimately, the most influential New Schoolers asserted that compe-
tition and combination were both possible and that some industries tended toward combina-
tion, based on their characteristic of high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Adams, The
Relationship of the State to Industrial Action, in 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC ASSOCIATION 471 (1887); cf R. ELY, PROBLEMS OF TODAY, supra note 44.
104. 21 CONG. REC. 5956 (1890). For examples of contemporaneous views of concentra-
tion as the result of a natural evolutionary process, see Andrews, The Economic Law of Mo-
nopoly, 26 J. Soc. Sci. 1, 11-12 (1890); Jenks, Capitalistic Monopolies and Their Relation to the
State, 9 POL. Sci. Q. 486, 503-09 (1894). For a recent analysis, see Horwitz, supra note 48, at
191 (portraying the development of the "inevitability of concentration" position).
105. This claim was prompted as well by the specter of European politics. 21 CONG. REC.
2460 (1890) ("be ready for the socialist, the communist, and the nihilist"). Regarding the
influence of European schools of political economy and the emergence of a separate "Ameri-
can" economics, see Adams, supra note 103, at 471 (1887).
106. See, e.g., F. WAYLAND, supra note 103, at 4; H. WOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF NATURAL LAW 16-17 (1894). For recent surveys, see H. COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN
MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880's
(1950); R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed. 1959); E.
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was natural, then competitive markets were inevitable, making govern-
mental intervention unnecessary. In other words, the natural tendency
to compete would overcome the current wave of combinations. In con-
trast, if Representative Stewart was correct, if there had evolved two nat-
ural tendencies and forces (competition and combination) then the
prospects for competitive markets were indeterminable.
Representative Stewart's view was also tough to swallow because it
challenged the classical view that a fair price derived from free exchanges
between roughly equal individuals. 10 7 Under this labor theory of value,
since commodities embody a worker's labor, it is labor that imparts mar-
ket value.108 Free exchanges among numerous independent trading part-
ners produce "natural" or "market" prices.109 Moreover, since each
party to such idealized transactions was imagined as getting something in
return that was proportional to his contribution, the prices and the pro-
cess were seen as not only natural and free, but also fair and just.110
Insofar as combinations charged prices higher or lower than the natural
market price, classical economics considered them unnatural, and per-
haps unjust, interlopers in the process of competitive markets.
Although classical economics permitted regulation of combinations,
it required such governmental intervention to conform with the classical
view of property law. Under this view, the state could interfere with an
individual's property rights only in a very limited set of circumstances
and through a very limited set of processes. This notion of property de-
rived from the strongly held sentiment, still powerful today, that a per-
son has a right to the product of her labor.1"' An example of the
problem raised by these sentiments is presented by the hypothetical ques-
tion already recounted about a short-horn cattle monopoly.,1 2 The issue
PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM
OF VALUE (1973).
107. See supra note 103 and sources cited therein.
108. If capital were expended, then, of course, the price naturally would reflect both kinds
of input units. See, eg., J.B. CLARK, supra note 103, at 14-17; F. WAYLAND, supra note 103, at
4-5.
109. As Arthur T. Hadley observed in his well-known study of the railroad industry, "We
accept almost without reserve the theory of Ricardo, that, under open competition in a free
market, the value of different goods will tend to be proportional to their cost of production."
A. HADLEY, supra note 103, at 69.
110. See, eg., J.B. CLARK, supra note 103, at 77; M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 109-39, 160-88, 253-66 (1977); Kennedy, supra note 33, at
943-45, 956.
111. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
limits imposed on state regulation of that property right. For an exhaustive treatment of state
antitrust regulation during this period, see May, supra note 3.
112. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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was under what circumstances the state can rightfully interfere with the
accumulation of property that would result from this cattle rancher's
hard work and ingenuity (his labor). The response was given that the
state can interfere only when the rancher has acted improperly by creat-
ing unnatural or "fictitious" prices.1 13 This response, however, did not
address the real problem. Even if nothing improper was done, a gap
would appear between fair price and market price. That is, a monopoly
price would be charged. Should the law characterize the monopoly profit
as a property right or as a "fictitious" price?
This battle had already been fought on constitutional grounds. As
discussed above, Munn v. Illinois (and other "Granger" cases) recog-
nized a state's right to regulate profit when there was a public interest in
the industry. 14 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois stat-
ute that set maximum prices farmers could be charged for wheat storage
in Chicago's grain elevators.' 15 But what about all those industries that
were not clothed in something called the "public interest"? What about
short-horn cattle?" 16 It was not clear that government could preserve or
impose competitive conditions-that is, indirectly control monopoly
pricing in those industries not clothed in the public interest.
Such controls would have to overcome strong commitments to the
sanctity of property. In particular, any governmental intervention, even
indirect price regulation by imposition of competition, would have to
confront a justification for monopoly profit couched in clearly classical
terms. This justification held that a monopoly price for short-horn cattle
was a competitive reward fairly won by "superior skill and intelli-
gence."1 17 Rather than confront the hard case of monopoly earned in the
meritocracy of the competitive process, Senator Edmunds hedged his re-
sponse: "He has not bought off his adversaries. He has not got the pos-
session of all the horned cattle in the United States."' 8 Thus, Senator
Edmunds failed to address what would happen if this gentleman rancher
had gotten hold of all the horned cattle in the United States, using only
his ingenuity, thus "prevent[ing] other men from engaging in fair compe-
tition with him."''119
113. 21 CONG. REC. 4102 (1890) (statement of Rep. Fitnian).
114. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
115. Id. at 135-36.
116. See Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 240 (1929) (finding that the petro-
leum industry is not clothed with the public interest).
117. For an explication of the relationship between property and liberty, see infra text
accompanying note 234.
118. 21 CONG. REC. 3151-52 (1890).
119. Id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
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The question was a difficult one, not only because of the problem of
earned monopoly, but also because the reality of a national economy fil-
led with combinations such as trusts and cartels called into question the
classical economics founded in an unrivaled tendency to compete. This
experience suggested that after the rancher dominated the market, his
rivals might decide to cooperate rather than compete. They might
choose, and even agree, to charge the price set by the dominant rancher.
Given that the dominant rancher was interested in the monopoly profits
his efforts allowed, he would not compete to the death. He would simply
charge his monopoly price, knowing that his rivals would rather follow
his lead than compete with his ingenuity and superior intelligence. The
resulting market would not tend toward competition, but rather toward
loose combination. Today, we might call this loose combination the
price leadership of oligopoly. For those who believed in the natural ten-
dency to compete embodied in classical economic theory, price leader-
ship was irrational conduct. 120 The economic facts, however, did not
seem to fit the classical theory.
The most ardent believer in the classical view had to concede that
the tendency to compete would take time to emerge. Until it did, the
ingenious rancher's rivals would enjoy unearned monopoly profits.
Could the state legitimately restructure or otherwise regulate the entire
industry, in the service of free exchange or fair profits? If the industry
were regulated, all could be reassured that "they could safely embody
their labor in commodities and freely exchange them." 121 In other
words, the property value of their labor (and other input factors), embod-
ied in commodities, would be protected by the contract law principle of
free exchange. Everyone would get no more than a fair return-every-
one, that is, except perhaps the ingenious and skilled gentleman rancher
no longer receiving his hard-earned monopoly profits.122
120. Scholarly responses included the work of neoclassicists like John Bates Clark, who
argued that "To regulate combinations is possible and, in some directions, desirable; to perma-
nently suppress them is impossible; to temporarily repress them is either to force them into
illegal forms, or to restore the internecine war from which a natural evolution has delivered
us." Clark, supra note 103, at 61; see Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-10
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (expressing similar fears).
121. Kennedy, supra note 33, at 956; F. WAYLAND, supra note 103, at 4-5 (describing
four fundamental laws that create and protect the right to the fruits of one's labor).
122. These problems of reconciling monopoly profit with the idea of free exchange and
with a labor theory of value become even more complex when viewed in the context of the new
19th century property right or entitlement to incorporate for general purposes (and thus to
form trusts). One way to understand the evolution of corporations from the privileged prod-
ucts of special legislation, to corporations as creatures of the state, and then to corporations as
"persons" for constitutional purposes is to think of each movement as a step in conceiving of
the corporation as an entity rather than a combination. See generally Horwitz, supra note 48,
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It is easy to see why monopolies or combinations in restraint of
trade were so problematic. Their very existence called into question one
of the basic tenets of classical economics and legal doctrine-the fairness
of market price as derived from free exchanges between roughly equal
individuals. Because actual market prices could mean monopoly price,
predatory price, or competitive price, actual market transactions no
longer seemed constrained by the competitive ideal of the market. Given
the ubiquity of trusts and other sorts of combinations, countless trades
could not be characterized as free exchanges between roughly equal
individuals.
This dissonance between combinations and the competitive ideal did
not go entirely unnoticed. In a scholarly critique of the classical view,
influential economist Henry Carter Adams wrote that combinations, and
corporations in particular, were destroying the "strategic equality"
among classically conceived competitors.' 23 Making the imbalance even
more pronounced, he wrote: "[T]hese corporations assert for themselves
most of the rights conferred on individuals by the law of private prop-
erty, and apply to themselves a social philosophy true only of a society
composed of individuals who are industrial competitors."1 24 Motivated
by similar concerns, other scholars, the popular "literature of protest,"
farmer and labor groups, as well as both the Democratic and the Repub-
lican Parties' platforms called for some antitrust action.' 25 Still, as Ros-
coe Pound has written, the classical economic vision continued to direct
the production of legal doctrine:
When in the last quarter of the nineteenth Century our courts were
called upon with increasing frequency to pass on the validity of social
legislation, in the transition from pioneer, rural, agricultural America
at 176-86 (discussing development of corporate personality). By then applying a labor theory
of value to this entity, now treated as a private person, an argument can be made to limit the
state's power over what could then be seen as vested property rights. The doctrinal watershed
was the decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344 (1829). The
Sherman Act introduced the daunting task of distinguishing between groups that were "prop-
erly" entitled to treatment as entities from those that were combinations, whether by agree-
ment or by merger, in restraint of trade. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of
Sen. Sherman, describing corporations as creatures of law and portraying combinations as
devices to prevent competition); id. at 2567 (statement of Sen. Hoar, commenting on the un-
constitutionality of congressional legislation that would deprive a state corporation of its state
charter and function); id. at 2570 (statement of Sen. George, asking: "As a combination, who
else is to combine with it except its own stockholders in the corporation?"). The problem was
particularly difficult, given the staying power of the classical economic and legal images of
laboring and trading individuals.
123. Adams, Publicity and Corporate Abuses, in 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE MICH. POL. SCI.
Ass'N 109, 116 (1894), reprinted in H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 320.
124. Id.
125. For an excellent overview, see H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 108-52.
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to the urban, industrial America of today, they turned to an idealized
picture of the economic order with which they were familiar, the prin-
ciples of which had been set forth by the classical political economists.
They pictured an ideal society in which there was a maximum of ab-
stract individual self-assertion. This was "liberty" as secured in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 126
This repression of the impulse toward equalizing market power and its
effects on liberty were reinforced by unquestioned belief in the principle.
that greater size always entails greater efficiency.1 27 Thus, the wave of
industrial combination, whether trusts, cartels, or pools, raised, deeply
troubling questions about the classical view that combinations would dis-
sipate because competition was inevitable.
The impulse toward equality could also be repressed by invoking the
classical view of competition as free exchange. Supporters of monopoly
and combinations in restraint of trade could call upon the powerful idea
of liberty.1 28 In much the same way that the individualist notion of lib-
erty as "abstract individual self-assertion"1 29 suppressed the tension
within industrial liberty, it forged a connection between combinations
and competition. In both instances, the impulse toward liberty overpow-
ered a complementary commitment to equality. In both instances, this
idealized notion of liberty legitimated private agreements, whether or not
they restrained competition, by supporting the counterfactual image of
typical market transactions as free exchanges between roughly equal par-
ties. In this way, the impulse toward liberty constituted the foundation
for a freedom of contract regime that relied on an ideal of equal competi-
tion and viewed social and economic reality as momentary aberrations
from the ideal. Thus, the impulse toward liberty provided a powerful
normative ground not only for the classical view of competition as free
trade, but also for the freedom to enter into private agreements, without
regard for their effects on competition. This idealized notion of liberty
and its insinuation of equality within the classical view of competition as
free trade was seen as justifying both competition and its restraint, both
industrial liberty and fair price. It provided common ground for explain-
ing and defending contradictory market conduct and confficting social
values.
126. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REV. 641, 653 (1923).
127. See, eg., D. WELLS, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE
PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY 73-75
(1896); Carnegie, Popular Illusions About Trusts, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH, AND OTHER
TIMELY ESSAYS 81-82 (2d ed. 1933); cf Clark, supra note 103, at 46 (all social classes benefit
from increased efficiency achieved through industrialization).
128. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
129. Pound, supra note 126, at 654.
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These tensions produced profound economic and political implica-
tions. They encouraged the belief that monopolization and combinations
in restraint of trade were justifiable. Not only could ingenious individu-
als win short-horn cattle monopolies in the free exchanges of competitive
markets, but the freedom to contract (and the liberty interest associated
with a fair return on one's property) was seen as legitimating agreements
to combine one's capital or labor with another. In sharp contrast, per-
ceptions of social and economic reality unconstrained by the classical
images exploded popular and scholarly beliefs in naturally competitive
markets and in natural connections between liberty and equality. Even-
tually, the loss of liberty itself became an issue:
The power of groups of men organized by incorporation as joint-stock
companies, or of small knots of rich men acting in combination, has
developed with unexpected strength in unexpected ways, overshad-
owing individuals and even communities, and showing that the very
freedom of association which men sought to secure by law when they
were threatened by the violence of the potentates may, under the shel-
ter of the law, ripen into a new form of tyranny. 130
The Sherman Act passed through a Congress struggling with ten-
sions between the political and economic mythology of artisans and local
markets, and the reality of a new economic order of large scale enterprise
and national markets.' 3 ' Despite the classical image of competition as
free trade and the underlying view of human nature as embodying an
irresistible tendency to compete, unregulated markets in reality seemed
to produce combinations of capital without bounds. Industrial liberty,
characterized in the debates as freedom from private (market) power,
authorized governmental intervention to reestablish the competitive mar-
kets overrun by powerful combinations of capital. But a return to the
classical image of perfect competition was not seen as an unalloyed good.
A contrasting rhetoric of fair price as well as a contrasting sense of
human nature as embodying a tendency to combine provided the logic
for arguments that some combination was a social good.
Congress' eleventh-hour turn to the common-law language of mo-
nopolization and restraints of trade represents a retreat from the 1888
Bill's explicit and unmediated imposition of competition as the only nat-
ural and legitimate form of commerce. The 1890 Bill's common-law lan-
guage of monopolization and restraint of trade carried with it familiar
and stable images drawn from classical economic and legal thought-
130. 2 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 407-08 (1889).
131. The balance between state and corporate power shifted noticeably with the passage of
the 1889 New Jersey general incorporation statute, followed by the Delaware legislation. See,
e.g., E. JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 30-31 (1923).
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powerful though counterfactual images of mythic proportion.13 2 The
classical views of economics and the common law proceeded on the as-
sumption that competition was the natural state of society and markets.
These classical ideals mediated the deeply felt fears engendered by the
widespread experience of disruption in traditional social and economic
patterns. The revised language proclaimed that trusts and restraints of
trade, not competition, were the problem. Although criticism of the
classical view of economics and departures from the common-law regime
of freedom of contract began to appear, congressional repose in the tradi-
tional language of the common law suggests a retreat to the traditional
doctrine and classical view. Moreover, economic and political impulses
toward both liberty and equality were seen as best served by permitting
this natural state to flourish. Finally, the idealized portrayal of commer-
cial markets as free exchanges between roughly equal individuals also
satisfied the social demand for a fair return on one's property or labor.
In the social and political turmoil of the new economic order, the
Sherman Act's language of the common law sought shelter from, but
only shifted the battleground for, the tension between the logics of com-
petition and private property. As this Article brings to light, confronta-
tions between the rhetorics of industrial liberty and fair price, as well as
their relationships to the social values of liberty and equality, character-
ize both the Sherman Act and the 1888 Bill, as well as the arguments
favoring and opposing each version and its amendments. The next sec-
tion examines the antitrust doctrine that emerged from the Supreme
Court as a result of these tensions embodied in the Sherman Act. It also
discusses what positions the Court took in this conflict between the logics
of competition and private property.
II. The "Literalists": Competition Logic and Equality
The Court's early antitrust opinions133 interpreting the Sherman
Act have been characterized as "literalist" constructions of the statute.134
But as William Letwin warned more than twenty years ago, we should
not allow the "literalist" label to obscure each succeeding opinion's drift
away from the proposition that all restraints of trade violated the Sher-
132. The standard reference for the cultural apparatus of mythology is C. LEvI-STRAUSS,
THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (R. Needham ed., J. Bell & J. von Sturmer
trans., rev. ed. 1969) (published first in France under the title LES STRUCTURES ELE-
MENTAIRES DE LA PARENTE (1949)).
133. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
134. W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 172-76.
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man Act. 135 Rather, the doctrinal movement evident in these early opin-
ions marks successive approximations of the "rule of reason" developed
in Justice White's early dissents and later adopted in his Standard Oil v.
United States majority opinion. 136 Despite this apparently converging
doctrine, Standard Oil's New Majority thought the remaining distance
important enough to shift to Justice White's rhetorical banner of reason.
Indeed, some Justices and commentators portrayed the move as a radical
shift. 137 Within a few weeks of the adoption of the "rule of reason,"
Congress reacted by holding private meetings and public hearings, which
ultimately resulted in two major pieces of antitrust legislation-the Clay-
ton and Federal Trade Commission Acts of 1914.138
This section explores the conditions that prompted the Court to
shift to a "rule of reason." Three important observations emerge from
considering the cases leading up to the decision in Standard Oil. First,
the opinions reflect and often articulate a conflict between the logics of
competition and property; despite what we might think today, competi-
tion policy was not the unrivaled major premise for early antitrust doc-
trine. Second, the lines were clearly drawn. The "literalist" or Old
Majority took competition as its first principle, while the "rule of reason"
minority and lower courts asserted the axiomatic nature of property pro-
tection. Third, those Justices who later constituted the "rule of reason"
or New Majority saw the shift as significant precisely because, as Justice
Holmes stated in his dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, "[t]he act says nothing about competition."'' 39 As de-
scribed in the last part of-this Article, Holmes' statement and the prop-
erty logic accompanying it signaled impending victory for the New
Majority under the "rule of reason."
A. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association
The Old Majority first formulated its "literalist" interpretation of
the Sherman Act in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa-
135. Id.
136. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
137. See, e.g., id. at 100-03 (Harlan, J., dissenting); A.H. WALKER, THE "UNREASONA-
BLE" OBITER DICTA OF CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE IN THE Standard Oil CASE 1-13 (1911) [here-
inafter A.H. WALKER, OBITER DICTA]. Albert H. Walker also wrote the first account of the
Sherman Act's legislative debates and early case law. A.H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHER-
MAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1910).
138. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44
(1982)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982)).
139. 193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904).
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tion. 140 In Trans-Missouri, the Freight Association was accused of fixing
uniform rates and terms in violation of the Sherman Act. The defend-
ants convinced the trial and appellate courts that their agreement "regu-
lated" rather than "suppressed" competition. 141 In particular, the trial
court found that the Association had fixed "reasonable prices" to prevent
"unhealthy competition" and "to avert personal ruin." 142 The court
stated, "The public is not entitled to free and unrestricted competition,
but what it is entitled to is fair and healthy competition ...."143
In the Supreme Court, the railroads claimed that "competition...
simply leads in railroad business to financial ruin and insolvency ...
[and] to the destruction of innocent stockholders. . . ."44 In short, the
defendants' arguments and lower court opinions, couched in the com-
mon-law language of reasonable restraint, restated prior congressional
speeches extolling the virtue of combination, the need to restrain compe-
tition, and the property right to a fair return on capital committed to the
marketplace. 145
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' holding that the
Freight Association's fixing of uniform rates and terms was reasonable
under the Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham made it clear
that all price fixing agreements were illegal, regardless of the reasonable-
ness of prices fixed: "Competition ... is a necessity for ... securing in
the end just and proper rates." 146 "Competition, free and unrestricted, is
the general rule." 147 In response, Justice White wrote a dissenting opin-
ion built upon the idea of reasonableness.14 8 He argued that Congress
intended to institutionalize the common law,- which distinguished be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade.149 Justice White
concluded that whether sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Act's
mandate for just and reasonable rates or the Sherman Act's common-law
ground for permitting reasonable restraints of competition, the railroads'
140. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
141. 58 F. 58, 73 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); see also Chicago Bd. of Trade,
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (true test of legality is whether the restraint merely
regulates rather than suppresses competition).
142. 53 F. 440, 451 (C.C.D. Kan. 1892), aff'd, 58 F. 58 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290
(1897); cf In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 112-13 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (holding that constitutionally,
the federal government cannot regulate the property of a corporation created by a state).
143. 53 F. at 453.
144. 166 U.S. at 330.
145. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
146. Trans-Missouri 166 U.S. at 333.
147. 1d. at 337.
148. Id. at 343.
149. Id at 346.
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ratemaking association was unobjectionable. 50 Either the majority's po-
sition outlawing a reasonable restraint was unreasonable, or the legisla-
tion itself was unreasonable. The consequence of this unreasonable
interpretation or legislation, Justice White maintained, was a subjection
of liberty of contract and freedom of trade "to the mere caprice of judi-
cial authority."' 5'
Although Trans-Missouri and the other early cases have been recog-
nized as attempts to grapple with the proper relationship between the
common law and the Sherman Act,15 2 attention to the opinions' underly-
ing logics permits an understanding of precisely what was at issue. To
begin, it is useful to remember that the Trans-Missouri majority and dis-
senting opinions were arguing about the reasonableness of an agreement
to fix prices, a debate already reported in the legislative record. The issue
of reasonable price again precipitated a confrontation between the con-
flicting rhetorics of competition and property. On one side, the majority
was quick to attribute to Congress an intent to prohibit all price agree-
ments because it was impossible to determine whether any agreed price
was reasonable. 153 Underlying the majority's position was a commitment
to the sovereignty of competition-that is, to the belief that only compe-
tition can produce a reasonable price. Neither parties to an agreement
nor judges are permitted to displace the pricing mechanism of
competition.
On the other side, Justice White's four-man dissent believed that
"[t]he plain intention of the [common] law was to protect the liberty of
contract and the freedom of trade."' 154 If the government intervened to
stop private parties from entering into a reasonable contract, then unrea-
sonable prices would be the consequence. Moreover, such judicial in-
junction interfered with the freedom to enjoy one's property in two ways.
First, a contract between willing parties was voided; the impulse toward
liberty was thwarted. Second, the value of the property involved was
(unreasonably) diminished by virtue of (unreasonably) lower profits. As
a result, unhealthy competition and unreasonable prices would prevail
due to the illegitimate exercise of judicial authority. 15 5 Like the congres-
sional speeches about fair price and the constitutional overtones of unrea-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 1, at 31; W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 144-81.
153. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 331-32.
154. Id. at 355.
155. Id.
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sonable price, Justice White's dissent exhibited concern for the right to
fix fair prices in order to assure a fair return on one's property.
Both Justices Peckham and White took the debate over competition
beyond a concern for pricing effects. Consistent with the congressional
debates about competition and combination, each argued that not only
the economic effects, but also the social and political effects of the other's
prescription would harm rather than help the peace and prosperity of
American society. Justice Peckham saw the problem as "motives of indi-
vidual or corporate aggrandizement as against the public interest." 15 6
Even if consumers benefit from lower prices, he wrote, private agree-
ments in restraint of trade would drive "out of business the small dealers
and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein .... Mere reduc-
tion in the price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by
the ruin of such a class ... of small but independent dealers."157 It is
clear that Justice Peckham's view of industrial liberty required roughly
equal firms of relatively small size
because it is not for the real prosperity of any country that such
changes should occur which result in transferring an independent busi-
ness man, the head of his establishment, small though it might be, into
a mere servant or agent of a corporation for selling the commodities
which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping
the business policy of the company and bound to obey orders issued by
others. 158
In this scenario, the problem was "combinations of capital [that] drive
out of business all the snall dealers in the commodity, and.., render the
public subject to the decision of the combination."15 9 The solution to
maintaining this important middle class of independent entrepreneurs
was "competition, free and unrestricted." 160
In contrast to this vision of industrial liberty practiced by numerous
independent entrepreneurs, Justice White saw a different problem and,
not surprisingly, a different solution. The problem forJustice White was
"the danger of contract or combination by the few against the interest of
the many and to the detriment of freedom."1 61 For Justice White, the
majority's commitment to free competition "strikes down the interest of
the many to the advantage and benefit of the few." 162 To illustrate his
156. Id. at 322-23.
157. Id. at 323.
158. Id. at 324.
159. Id. at 323-24.
160. 'Id at 337.
161. Id. at 355-56.
162. Id.
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point, Justice White referred to In re Debs, 163 in which the trial court's
interpretation of the Sherman Act in issuing an injunction against the
striking union in the infamous Pullman Company case "makes [the Act]
embrace every peaceable organization or combination of the laborer to
benefit his condition either by obtaining an increase of wages or diminu-
tion of the hours of labor." t 64 In short, a prohibition of reasonable agree-
ments to create the countervailing power necessary to bargain for fair
wages-a fair return on labor-threatened industrial warfare. In much
the same fashion, wrote Justice White, the "utmost liberty of con-
tracting" was necessary to forestall the ruin that free competition be-
tween railroads would entail. 165 "Undue restraint of the liberties of the
citizen," proscribing agreements in reasonable restraint of competition,
would bring on a state of industrial warfare. 166
As Trans-Missouri illustrates, the disagreement between the "literal-
ist" and "rule of reason" factions involved much more than a lawyerly
argument over proper techniques of statutory interpretation. Rather, the
underlying conflict was normative and involved a choice between two
competing visions of society. On the one hand, the literalists argued that
the policy directing the antitrust laws should rest upon free and un-
restricted competition between roughly equal market participants,
whether or not the consequence in any particular transaction is fair or
reasonable. On the other hand, the advocates of a rule of reason urged
that antitrust policy should tolerate large consolidations of capital and
allow private agreements that restrain trade when the agreements protect
a fair return from property or some other reasonable exercise of freedom
of contract. Supreme Court opinions in antitrust's formative period can
be understood as a series of struggles to win this conflict between com-
peting visions of society.
B. United States v. Joint Traffic Association
Justice Peckham's opinions in the two terms following Trans-Mis-
souri showed movement toward the "rule of reason" position. Evidence
of such movement is found in the United States v. Joint Traffic Associa-
163. 64 F. 724, 745-55 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd as to decree, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
164. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 356.
165. Id. at 355. It is important to keep in mind that Justice White attempted to justify
accumulations of capital by reference to combinations of labor. Cf 21 CONG. REC. 2728
(1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar, distinguishing combinations of labor from combinations of
capital).
166. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 354.
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tion 167 concession that the Antitrust Act required a "reasonable con-
struction." Moreover, the literalists shifted from the position that every
contract in restraint of trade was illegal, to the position that only those
contracts "whose direct and immediate effect" was to restrain interstate
commerce were illegal. 168 Contracts with only an indirect effect on com-
merce did not violate the Act. While this new doctrine sounded very
much like Justice White's formulation of an unreasonable restraint of
trade, there remained an important difference. For Justice White, even a
contract with a direct restraint on interstate commerce could still be
deemed reasonable under certain circumstances.1 69
Although there was some convergence of the literalist and rule of
reason views in Joint Traffic Association, there was no doctrinal move-
ment on two critical points. First, the defendants claimed that the stat-
ute as interpreted would destroy fifth amendment rights of liberty and
property by limiting their right to make contracts:
A just freedom of contract ... is one of the most important ights...
of "liberty," for all human industry depends upon such freedom for its
fair reward.
The use of property is an essential part of it .... Its use is
abridged when the owner is precluded from any contract that is neces-
sary... to secure to him a just compensation for its employment. 170
In response to this constitutional claim of fair return, Justice
Peckham wrote that an argument "that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation ... is, we think, plainly
irrelevant," because Congress has the power to regulate private contracts
that restrain interstate commerce. 171 Despite "general liberty of contract
... there are many kinds of contracts which... may yet be prohib-
ited."172 The takings issue, however, was plainly relevant to the rail-
roads, to Justice White and his colleagues, and to some members of the
fifty-first Congress, all of whom produced statements making property-
167. 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (quoting Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600
(1898)).
168. Id These statements also can be characterized as concessions to the dissenting Jus-
tices' property logic.
169. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 350.
170. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 533.
171. Id. at 571. Justice Peckham also refused to adopt the government's argument that
the railroad industry was clothed with the public interest and was subject to government regu-
lation as were the warehouses in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See supra note 73-75
and accompanying text. Thus, the statement that the "taking" argument was irrelevant repre-
sents a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of a property logic, whatever its permissible
conclusions about the price fixing conspiracy.
172. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. at 572.
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based arguments. The takings issue was irrelevant to Justice Peckham
because his statements were competition-based.
The second point in Joint Traffic Association on which there was no
doctrinal movement was the majority's position that competition is the
only legitimate arbiter of what constitutes a reasonable price. Justice
Peckham conceived of the Sherman Act as a congressional enactment of
the natural laws of competition. "We do not think . . . that ordinary
freedom of contract in the use and management of their property re-
quires the right to combine ... for the purpose of stifling competition
among themselves, and of thus keeping their rates higher than they
might otherwise be under the laws of competition." 173 Moreover, in
sharp contrast to the defendants' constitutional claim that the statute de-
stroys property, Justice Peckham wrote that the agreement "destroys
competition" between the parties. 174 Thus, although the Joint Traffic As-
sociation majority's doctrine moved away from a literalist position and
toward a rule of reason standard, an impasse remained. Both the major-
ity and the dissent were committed to incompatible normative positions
staked in competition and property logics.
C. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
In the Court's following term, Justice White actually joined Justice
Peckham's majority opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. 175 The common ground for this apparent resolution of the conflict
between Justices Peckham and White was the Sixth Circuit's reconstruc-
tion of the common law: it held that all reasonable and ancillary re-
straints were considered valid, because they promoted "the free purchase
and sale of property." 176 Thus, the Sherman Act could be read as simply
restating the common law in its proscription of all direct restraints. 177
Circuit Judge Taft's legerdemain seemed to bridge the gap between the
positions of Justices Peckham and White. The relationship between the
common law and the statute was presented in a new and acceptable way
that promoted property interests. Moreover, in holding that the defend-
ants' price agreement was direct and thus illegal, Judge Taft's opinion
rested on a common law that served competition as well. To allow such
agreements would entail the judicial "power to say . . . how much re-
straint of competition is in the public interest" and thus would require
173. Id. at 570-71.
174. Id. at 564-65.
175. 175 U.S. 211, 244 (1899), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
176. 85 F. 271, 281 (1899) (Taft, J.).
177. Id.
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courts to "set sail on a sea of doubt." 178 In short, competition remained
for Judge Taft the final arbiter of what constitutes a reasonable price.
Despite the doctrinal confluence of Justice White's common-law po-
sition and Justice Peckham's statutory-law position in Addyston Pipe, the
mediation between property and competition logics was illusory. Simply
put, Judge Taft's assertion that competition was the only legitimate pric-
ing mechanism precluded anything more than a momentary relaxation of
tensions. The fact remained that a property logic, with its emphasis on
freedom of contract and a fair return from property, recognized the legit-
imacy and reasonableness of some direct restraints of trade, including
some agreements about price. Nonetheless, in Justice Peckham's opinion
for a unanimous Court, a conflict between these two positions was
averted because the prices were found to be unreasonable. 179 All partici-
pating Justices agreed that when "private contracts.., result in the regu-
lation of interstate commerce," Congress has the power to legislate,
because the "liberty of the citizen .. . is limited by the commerce
clause."' 180 The uncontroversial logic was that given congressional power
to trump state legislation that affects interstate commerce, there can be
no question of the power to trump private regulation of interstate
commerce.
D. Northern Securities Co. v. United States
Before long, the illusory coalition in Addyston Pipe evaporated in the
heat of the notorious Northern Securities Co. v. United States. '81 Addys-
ton Pipe's fallout, however, created a new alliance, which found Justice
Harlan writing a majority opinion that followed the interpretive practices
of Justice Peckham's earlier opinions, but Justice Peckham joining in two
dissenting opinions-one by Justice White and the other by Justice
Holmes. 182 Moreover, Justice Brewer, while concurring in the Court's
178. Id. at 284.
179. 175 U.S. at 238.
180. Id. at 229.
181. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The defendants included buccaneering financiers and captains
of industry, J.P. Morgan, John S. Kennedy, and James J. Hill. President Theodore Roosevelt
provided the government's trustbusting animus.
182. Northern Securities involved a "tight" combination, rather than the "loose" combina-
tions or cartels attacked in the preceding government prosecutions. It seems appropriate to
say something about the problem of a slippery slope between contracts among entities and
contracts fusing multiple entities into one. First, "loose" combinations, such as price fixing
cartels or profit pooling agreements were under attack, both in the state and federal courts.
Thbugh a few states prosecuted "tight" combinations, both United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
156 U.S. 1 (1895), which confined the Sherman Act to a narrow view of interstate commerce,
and the Justice Department's prosecutorial neglect of the trusts, gave confidence to promoters
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holding, also announced his shift to a "rule of reason" analysis, a shift
premised on "the inalienable right[ ] of every citizen" "to manage his
own property and determine the place and manner of its investment." 183
In short, Northern Securities saw the Old Majority's literalist rhetoric of
competition go up in smoke.
Still, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court in Northern Securities; Jus-
tice Brewer's defection to a rule of reason analysis did not impel him to
disagree, as it did Justice Peckham, with the plurality holding that the
Northern Securities Company's formation was an illegal combination.1 84
Nonetheless, it was clear that a majority of the Court no longer agreed
with the old Peckham-Harlan reliance on a competition-founded Sher-
man Act. The Old Majority disintegrated under the pressure of this par-
adigm case of an ancillary and thus reasonable restraint under the
traditional common law. The defendants argued, with plausible support
in the congressional debates, that the common-law meaning of restraint
of trade was the basis for interpreting the Sherman Act. Thus, they con-
tended, it is highly relevant that, under the common law, "[i]t has been
held repeatedly that such restraints as result from the sale or the
purchase of property are not within the provisions of [the] anti-trust stat-
utes." 1 85 The common "law does not require competition. The business
of a rival may be purchased for the purpose of being rid of his competi-
tion." 1 86 The defendants argued at great length that the common law
authorized citizens or state corporations to dispose of their property and
invest their money in any way they chose.187 Characterizing this right in
and business owners who engaged in trustbuilding and other sorts of interstate merger activity.
To the extent that trusts seemed less risky than cartels, the tendency to combine tended toward
trustbuilding. Second, "loose" combinations were unstable and difficult to enforce. They were
unstable for many reasons. Simply agreeing on a price was difficult, given the differing costs
faced by different parties. An acceptable price for a more efficient firm might not be an ade-
quate price for a less efficient one. In some sense, no one was entirely pleased with the agreed
upon price. It is not surprising that some parties to such compromise agreements would give
secret discounts or cheat in other ways. If the agreements were to have any value, they would
require policing mechanisms. Even with such provisions, however, simple identification of
noncomplying parties was of little value, because state courts typically refused to enforce the
agreements. The greater the number of participating entities, the greater the transaction costs
associated with reaching and privately enforcing an agreement to restrain competition. Thus,
"tight" combinations or fusion of many entities into one entity can be understood as a rational
response to the instability and high transaction costs associated with contracts between enti-
ties. See, e.g., H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at 72-77; Washburn, History of a Statute: The
Sherman Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890, 8 B.U.L. REV. 95, 97-98 (1928).
183. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 361.
184. Id. at 360-64.
185. Id. at 293.
186. Id. at 275.
187. Id. at 237, 241, 245-46, 254, 264, 272, 275, 287, 290, 293-97.
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the fifth amendment terms that had already been rejected in earlier cases,
the defendants concluded: "This constitutional provision protects the
right to acquire property-equally with the right-to hold the same after
it has been acquired."188
In the last battle won before losing the war, Justice Harlan took up
the rhetoric of competition in the name of stare decisis. First, he posed
the question directly: "[Does the Sherman Act forbid] every combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade... ? Or... only such restraints as are
unreasonable... ?... Does the act of Congress prescribe... that the
operation of the natural laws of competition . . . not be restricted or
interfered with by any contract, combination or conspiracy? 189 Justice
Harlan answered the question straightforwardly, taking "certain proposi-
tions... plainly deducible" from the early literalist opinions, as well as
the common law of the several states. 190 The major premise of the
Court's earlier opinions was that "the act is not limited to restraints...
that are unreasonable in their nature, but embraces all direct re-
straints."1 91 In sum, he rejected a rule of reason analysis because "Con-
gress has, in effect, recognized the rule of free competition by declaring
illegal every combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and in-
ternational commerce." 192
Justice Harlan also addressed the constitutional challenge raised by
the defendants. He wrote that "the constitutional guarantee of liberty of
contract does not prevent Congress from prescribing the rule of free com-
petition," because the "natural effect of competition is to increase com-
merce, and an agreement whose direct effect is to prevent this play of
competition restrains.., trade and commerce." 193 Justice Harlan noted
that it was not necessary to deal directly with defendants' due process
claim regarding property because the questions raised were too abstract
and general.194 This cavalier treatment of the property argument, how-
ever, was unconvincing, especially because the questions posed were
neither abstract nor general. They dealt with material consequences of
specific positions taken regarding the constitutional scope of congres-
sional power. In concrete terms, the defendants were arguing that the
government's interference with their reasonable strategy to limit the ru-
188. Id. at 295.
189. Id. at 328-29.
190. Id. at 331 (citing Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
191. Id. (emphasis in original).
192. Id. at 337.
193. Id. at 331-32.
194. Id. at 333-34.
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inous effects of competition was an unconstitutional taking of their prop-
erty. The government was preventing them from entering into
agreements to preserve the reasonable value of their assets. The real
problem for Justice Harlan was that he could not resolve questions about
property rights with statements produced by a commitment to competi-
tion. He could only repeat that the rule of competition was paramount-
not much of a response to arguments that the rule of property should
prevail.
Little more could have been said to resolve this impasse between two
logics in conflict. For Justice Harlan, whose thinking was inscribed with
the logic of competition, and for his colleagues and the circuit court
judge, it was enough to write, "If such combination be not destroyed, all
the advantages that would naturally come to the public under the opera-
tion of the general laws of competition ... will be lost. 1 95 For the de-
fendants and the dissenting Justices, who were committed to a property
logic, the issues took on a different character. For them, the majority's
view would "deprive the individual of his freedom to acquire, own and
enjoy property by descent, contract or otherwise, because railroads or
other property might become the subject of interstate commerce."1 96 In
those words, and in Justice Holmes' dissent as well, we hear the sound of
not-so-distant trumpets. The Old Majority's entrenchment in competi-
tion would soon be overrun. A New Majority, with recruits won under
the banner of reason, would soon shift the balance in favor of the prop-
erty logics of fair return on property and freedom of contract. Few mem-
ories of the long struggle would survive the last battle.
III. The "Rule of Reason": Property Logic and Liberty
Indeed, Northern Securities was the last great battle between the two
factions. It is easy to see why this case splintered the Court, impelling
Justices Peckham and Brewer to abandon their competition logics in
favor of the rule of reason. Unlike the earlier cartel cases, this merger or
trust presented two familiar themes. On one side, a trust was restraining
competition and extracting unfair prices from consumers. On the other
side, a merger appeared to be a sale of property whose effects on competi-
tion were tolerated at common law because they were seen as ancillary.
The circumstances under which the Northern Securities Company
trust was formed offer a new perspective on the opening aphorism in
Justice Holmes' Northern Securities dissent: "Great cases like hard cases
195. Id. at 327.
196. Id. at 377.
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make bad law." 197 This was a great case because "of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the judgment" 198-the involvement of men with (in)famous public
personae, such as financier J.P. Morgan and, in the background, Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt. It was also a "hard case" because of the at-
tendant economic problems, problems mentioned only in passing and
only in Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court.
Justice Harlan dedicated several pages to recounting in minute de-
tail the large sums of money involved in the consolidations and the huge
expanses of competing railway roads, now merged, from the Great Lakes
to the Pacific Ocean. "The Great Northern Railway Company and the
Northern Pacific Railway Company owned ... two lines, main and
branches, about 9,000 miles in length, [which] were and are parallel and
competing lines across the continent.., and.., were engaged in active
competition for freight and passenger traffic .... 199 In addition, the
two companies purchased over 200 million dollars in capital stock of the
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railway Company, whose lines aggre-
gated about 8000 miles. Following that, the principals filed articles of
incorporation in New Jersey for the Northern Securities Company and
authorized capital stock of 400 million dollars. Stock in this new corpo-
ration was exchanged for railroad company stock, which was held and
voted by the Northern Securities Company board of directors. Thus, a
holding company or trust had been formed to control over 17,000 miles
of track (as well as rolling stock and other assets) covering the Western
United States and to consolidate three railroads, two of which had paral-
lel and competing lines. This series of transactions was easily portrayed
as a combination in restraint of trade or a monopolization of the railroad
transportation business in a substantial part of the country. These facts
clearly supported the Court's finding of a Sherman Act violation.
There was, however, another side to these economic circumstances.
Justice Harlan's opinion made brief mention of Northern Pacific's eco-
nomic distress:
Prior to 1893 the Northern Pacific system was owned... by the
Northern Pacific Railroad Company .... That company becoming
insolvent, its road and property passed into the hands of receivers ap-
pointed by the courts of the United States. In advance of foreclosure
and sale a majority of its bondholders made an arrangement with the
Great Northern Railway Company for a virtual consolidation of the
197. I at 400.
198. IdM
199. I at 320.
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two systems .... 200
Only one further allusion was made to this agreement made in advance
of foreclosure, 20 an agreement designed to save the value of the North-
ern Pacific shareholders' property from ruinous competition. Justice
Harlan concluded that the decree ordering the trust's dissolution would
"destroy, not the property interests of the original stockholders of the
constituent companies, but the power of the holding corporation. ' 20 2
Perhaps he felt that another willing buyer could have been found. It was
unlikely, however, that anyone other than Northern Pacific's parallel and
overlapping rival would have found the 9000 miles of parallel and over-
lapping track attractive, especially given the recent history of fierce com-
petition and the claims of overcapitalization. 20 3 Justice Harlan also
might have believed that the overcapitalization claims were well-founded
or that the Northern Pacific shareholders' alternative-selling assets for
salvage value at a foreclosure sale-represented the natural and just
workings of the laws of competition on private property put at risk in
commerce. Indeed, there were those "who believe that [the rule of com-
petition] is more necessary in these days of enormous wealth than it ever
was in any former period of our history.' '2° 4 At the very least, Justice
Harlan was persuaded to apply a rule of competition because, "as Con-
gress has embodied that rule in a statute, that must be, for all, the end of
the matter, if this is to remain a government of laws, and not of men.1 20 5
While Justice Harlan's opinion discussed all the issues raised in the
case, the opinions of the two dissenting Justices, Justice White and Jus-
tice Holmes, divided the issues. Justice White's dissent addressed the
fifth amendment question of congressional power to regulate or control
ownership of state chartered railroads. He repeated the apocalyptic vi-
200. Id. at 320-21.
201. For doctrinal articulations of the modem failing company defense to antimerger ac-
tions, see United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-07 (1974); United
States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 773-74 (7th Cir. 1977).
202. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 357-58.
203. For introductions to the natural monopoly cost structure that can provide the point
of departure for a loss-minimizing logic of ruinous competition between railroads, see T. MOR-
GAN, J. HARRISON, & P.R. VERKUIL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS- CASES AND
MATERIALS, at 15-17 (2d ed. 1985); R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 4-11 (2d ed.
1984).
But there is another account of the railroads' financial plight: overcapitalization. In other
words, the promoters raised much more capital than the firms required, either in anticipation
of monopoly profits or in funding outrageously high promoters' fees. H. THORELLI, supra note
3, at 280-81, 315, 417, 422, 522, 540, 575. Justice White seemed to discount this claim. North-
ern Sec., 193 U.S. at 366-67 (White, J., dissenting).
204. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 337.
205. Id. at 338.
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sion of a literalist Court's "disregard [of] the great guaranty of life, lib-
erty and property and every other safeguard upon which organized civil
society depends. '20 6 Justice White also raised one argument that distin-
guishes Northern Securities from the earlier cartel cases. He asserted that
governmental prohibition of mergers or "tight" combinations constitutes
regulation of property ownership. "[Tihe power of Congress to regulate
commerce," he argued, does not entail the power "to regulate the owner-
ship of stock in railroads, which is not commerce at all."'20 7 In separat-
ing the status of ownership from the conduct of commerce, Justice
White's argument was the fifth amendment analogue of the familiar com-
mon law doctrine that restraints ancillary to the sale of a business were
reasonable. Indeed, several defendants characterized the formation of
the trust as the sale of a business to a competitor.20 8
Justice Holmes' dissent focused on the common-law notion of "com-
bination." The Old Majority's refusal to recognize the Act's common-
law foundation led Justice Holmes to conclude with a Hobbesian, literal-
ist vision of the Sherman Act as keeper of the natural laws of competi-
tion: Justice Harlan's position "would make eternal the bellum omnium
contra omnes."209 In Justice Holmes' view, Congress did not mean to
enact as positive law Herbert Spencer's social darwinism. Rather, Con-
gress was concerned with restraints of trade because of "their intended
effect upon strangers to the firm."' 210 That is, Congress feared "trusts,
the objection to which, as every one knows, was not the union of former
competitors, but the sinister power exercised ... by the combination in
keeping rivals out of the business and ruining those who already were
in.,211 Clearly, Justice Holmes was taking up the "combination" and
"fair price" side of the congressional debates-statements produced by
the logic of property. "It was the ferocious extreme of competition with
others, not the cessation of competition among the partners, that was the
evil feared, '212 he concluded. In short, the feared evil was the mainte-
nance of market conditions destructive of the right to a fair price.
According to Justice Holmes, while predatory pricing and other
such conduct should be enjoined under the Act, the Act does not require
dissolution of combinations. The Act does not "require all existing com-
petitions to be kept on foot, and ... invalidate the continuance of old
206. Id at 397.
207. Id at 368.
208. See, eg., id. at 275, 287, 293.
209. Id. at 411 (war of all against all).
210. I1d at 404.
211. Id at 405.
212. Id
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contracts by which former competitors united in the past. ' 213 Dissolu-
tion or disintegration introduced dangers even more threatening than
governmental redistribution of property. For Justice Holmes, the Old
Majority's competition-based rhetoric entailed "the universal disintegra-
tion of society into single men, each at war with all the rest, or even the
prevention of all further combinations for a common end."' 214 "If that
were its intent I should regard calling such a law a regulation of com-
merce as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to reconstruct
society." 21 5
Justice Holmes' turn to hyperbole suggests that he too was caught
up in the heated struggle between property and competition logics. For
example, Justice Holmes characterized the majority's commitment to
competition as entailing a "universal disintegration of society" or a literal
ban on combination.216 Yet, the direct-indirect effects doctrine carried
forward in Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court both evidenced com-
promise and allowed for the creation of some combinations. Nonethe-
less, Justice Holmes and the new rule of reason majority required more.
They subordinated competition rhetoric to its property-based counter-
part.217 Most telling was his statement that "the Act says nothing about
competition. '218 The ironic implication was that the old literalist major-
ity should take seriously the literal language of the statute. In analyzing
the common-law doctrine of "restraints of trade," rather than the mean-
ing of "competition," Justice Holmes quipped, "I stick to the exact
words used. ' 2 19 As if to emphasize the uncompromising nature of this
213. Id. at 410.
214. Id. at 407.
215. Id. at 411.
216. Id. at 407.
217. Although much has been made of the "great case" or interpersonal dimension of
Justice Holmes' dissent, its language of hyperbole is more usefully understood as emerging
from a commitment to the primary importance of property rights. W. LETWIN, supra note 3,
at 229-37.
218. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 403. Some commentators have trivialized this statement as
disingenuous. That interpretation is based on the assumption that Justice Holmes' subjective
intent was to jab at Theodore Roosevelt, who had appointed him and who, according to that
view, expected his appointee to toe the line. See, e.g., W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 229-37.
Whether or not this subjective intent was working, it (as Justice Holmes himself might have
said) is not relevant here. What is relevant is the manner in which Justice Holmes articulated
his intent, whatever it was. In other words, I take his statement seriously at an objective level:
that he chose to make his statement in anti-"competition" terms is itself significant because of
the force relations that produced it, and because of what it announces about the relative
strength of those forces. For a brief analysis of Justice Holmes' freedom of contract view in a
state antitrust law case, see May, supra note 3, at 536-37 (describing Justice Holmes' view of an
overbroad state antitrust statute as an unconstitutional taking of property).
219. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 403.
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demand, Justice Holmes characterized the railroad combination's effect
on competition as immaterial:
If such a remote result of the exercise of an ordinary incident of prop-
erty and personal freedom is enough to make that exercise unlawful,
there is hardly any transaction concerning commerce between the
States that may not be made a crime by the finding of a jury or a
court.
2 2 0
Certainly the novelty, size, and complexity of this series of transactions
and the resulting trust made them anything but ordinary. Moreover, the
competitive effects of the three-way consolidation were immediate, rather
than remote. But for Justice Holmes, it was the exercise of a property
right that appeared proximate. In the process of portraying the Act's
legislative history as a rehearsal of common-law property rights, he ig-
nored precisely the statements serving competition upon which Justice
Harlan relied.221
In tandem, the Harlan and Holmes opinions in Northern Securities
carried forward the conflict between competition and property logics evi-
dent in congressional debates over the Sherman Act. Along with Justice
Brewer's brief concurring opinion, the four dissenting Justices effected a
shift of power on the Court. The formal announcement of doctrinal vic-
tory for the new rule of reason majority and its property logic was made
several years later in the companion cases of United States v. American
Tobacco Co.222 and Standard Oil v. United States.223 The remainder of
this section examines the Court's new property logic as explicated in Jus-
tice White's opinions in American Tobacco and Standard Oil.
In American Tobacco, Justice White grounded the rule of reason not
in its salutary effect on trade and commerce, but rather in a purpose "to
prevent that act from destroying all liberty of contract and all substantial
right to trade, and thus causing the act to be at war with itself by annihi-
lating the fundamental right of freedom to trade .... -"224 In his Northern
Securities dissent, Justice White had already expressed concern about the
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
222. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
223. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Standard Oil also met Justice Holmes' definition of a great case.
Like Northern Securities, Standard Oil was filed during Theodore Roosevelt's trustbusting ad-
ministrations, in the same federal court in Minnesota, with virtually the same pleadings. See
W. LETWIN, supra note 3, at 253. Though in Standard Oil a New Majority formed behind
Justice White's "rule of reason," the results were the same as in Northern Securities: the Court
affirmed a decree breaking up the trust.
224. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 180. For claims that policy conflict only arose at the
time of the Clayton Act, see F. RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT xi (1962 & Supp. 1964) ("paradox of antitrust at war with itself"); Bork, The Place of
Antitrust Among National Goals, in BASIC -ANTITRUST QUESTIONS IN THE MIDDLE SIXTIES:
January 1989]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
consequences of governmental regulation of this fundamental right: "The
principle that the ownership of property is embraced within the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, whenever that body deems that a partic-
ular character of ownership ... may restrain commerce .... is in my
opinion in conflict with the most elementary conceptions of rights of
property. ' 225 Justice White believed that the rule of reason would fore-
stall the Sherman Act's unreasonable intrusion into the citizen's liberty
to buy and sell property. His belief arose from the following jurispruden-
tial context. In the cases preceding Standard Oil, the battle on the Court
was waged at two levels of discourse. First, it was expressed in terms of
the relationship between the Sherman Act and common-law restraints of
trade. The "literalists" maintained that the Sherman Act prohibited
every agreement in restraint of competition. The "rule of reason" faction
argued that the common-law notion of liberty to contract sanctions such
agreements to the extent that they fix prices that allow a fair return on
property or labor put into the market. Second, the conflict in the Court
was also expressed in terms of the relationship between congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce and fifth amendment rights of lib-
erty and property. For example, the literalists argued that the Constitu-
tion's commerce clause trumps an individual's right to buy railroad
company stock when the transaction "directly" restrains interstate com-
merce. In contrast, the "rule of reason" faction insisted that the fifth
amendment protects an individual's right to purchase railroad company
stock, even if it eliminates competition between railroads in interstate
commerce.
These common-law and constitutional arguments in the cases pre-
ceding Standard Oil set the terms of an ongoing conflict between those
committed to "full and free competition" and those committed to indi-
vidual rights of property. It is important to recognize, however, that the
fifth amendment rhetoric of liberty introduced a new element into the
conflict. The property logic of "fair price," heard in the congressional
debates, was now joined by an aligned but independent rhetoric of liberty
to contract. This new rhetoric made explicit a tension within the notion
of industrial liberty. As shown in the earlier discussion of the legislative
debates, references to industrial liberty were taken to mean markets char-
acterized by rough competitive equality.226 This image of freedom from
(private) market power reappeared in the literalist jurisprudence of full
FIFTH CONFERENCE ON THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 12 (Nat'l In-
dus. Conf. Bd. 1966); for a critique, see Peritz, supra note 1, at 1231-61.
225. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 370.
226. See supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
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and free competition. The legislative debates, however, made no refer-
ence to the other aspect of industrial liberty-freedom from governmen-
tal intrusion into private agreements. This unspoken side of industrial
liberty found voice in Justice White's constitutional rhetoric of liberty to
contract. Thus, Justice White grounded the rule of reason in a constitu-
tional rhetoric not heard in the congressional debates. 227
Justice White's rule of reason separated the language of industrial
liberty from its rhetorical moorings. Under the banner of reason, the
Standard Oil opinion replaced the competition logic of "liberty to pursue
any livelihood or vocation" with the property logic of "freedom to ac-
quire, own, and enjoy property." For the literalists, the problem in
merger cases such as Standard Oil was the accumulation of property to
consolidate market power. Their Sherman Act solution entailed regula-
tion of property rights when they restrained competition. For the rule of
reason faction, the problem was a "literalist" Sherman Act with govern-
ment intruding upon individual liberty and property rights. The rule of
reason solution invited private regulation of competition to protect those
individual rights. The clearest statement of this concern is found in Jus-
tice White's earlier Northern Securities dissent:
For it would follow that if Congress deemed [that] the acquisition by
one or more individuals engaged in interstate commerce of more than a
certain amount of property would be prejudicial to interstate com-
merce, the amount of property held or the amount which could be
employed in interstate commerce could be regulated. 228
If Congress could regulate an individual's right to exchange or use prop-
erty, Justice White believed, liberty of contract would be destroyed.
In the rule of reason opinions for the New Majority, Justice White
abandoned explicit fifth amendment references. Instead, he returned to
common-law discourse for a parallel property-liberty argument: "Mo-
nopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual free-
dom of contract. '229 At common law as well, the argument's axiomatic
point of departure was "freedom to contract [which] was the essence of
freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract. ' 230 The rule of
reason's deployment of this common-law rhetoric of liberty effected two
important changes in antitrust jurisprudence. First, the New Majority
was willing to allow some private agreements that restrain competition.
227. Justice White believed, of course, that there were numerous antecedents in legislative
references to the common law of restraints of trade. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50, 61.
228. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
229. It was this restriction on freedom of contract that caused "injury to the public."
Standard 011, 221 U.S. at 54.
230. Id. at 62.
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Second, it was an impulse toward liberty that animated that willingness.
The rule of reason represented a diminished interest in equalizing (pri-
vate) market power and a heightened concern for curbing governmental
power. Although limiting governmental intrusion can be portrayed as
expanding the domain of everyone's personal autonomy, inattention to
market power would benefit the status quo of those already in positions
to acquire or maintain market power.
Despite the New Majority's distaste for equalizing market power,
liberty itself imposed some limitations on dominant firms. That is, under
the rule of reason an exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of
trade could sometimes amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade. In
particular, the rule of reason allowed that market power could be exer-
cised in some "unnatural" way, beyond the making of normal and usual
contracts. Thus, "unusual and wrongful" acts, such as predatory pricing
followed by purchases of rival firms, overstepped the bounds of freedom
and properly called for governmental intervention. 23 1 In general, how-
ever, sovereign involvement was unreasonable since the "centrifugal and
centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the
means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no extrane-
ous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make unlawful con-
tracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted. '232 Evidence of
predatory pricing and other kinds of "fierce competition" provided the
specific foundation for the New Majority's affirmances of decrees break-
ing up the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies. That in-
stantiated the rule of reason's proscription of "unlawful contracts having
a monopolistic tendency." Further, monopoly by sovereign grant was
both familiar and unpopular. But what did Justice White mean by his
reference to "extraneous power" imposing monopoly?
Examining Justice White's reference to "extraneous or sovereign
power" imposing monopoly can elucidate the rule of reason's liberty-
property logic and its relationship to the congressional debates' property
logic of fair price. One way to approach the question is to think about
the image of centrifugal and centripetal forces swirling around a nuclear
"right to freely contract." The metaphor of two countervailing forces
parallels Representative Stewart's image of two great natural forces in
society- combination and competition-tempering one another.233
Nonetheless, there are two significant differences between the views of
Representative Stewart and Justice White. First, Representative Stew-
231. Id. at 181.
232. Id. at 62.
233. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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art's central or meta-principle of fair price or fair return on property
placed in the market represents a property logic committed to the princi-
ple of equality. In sharp contrast, Justice White's opinion deploys a
property logic committed to the principle of liberty. It places freedom of
contract at the nucleus of these natural forces: one pulls inward to con-
solidate or combine, while the other force pushes outward to disperse or
atomize. These opposing energies "result[ ] from the right to freely con-
tract. '234 Second, Representative Stewart's model of two contending
forces calls for an occasional third force-governmental intervention to
restrain extreme forms of competition or combination. Again in sharp
contrast, Justice White's view entails only two natural forces resulting
from liberty of contract. Moreover, should a third or extraneous force
enter his equation, its presence could (or would) destroy the delicate bal-
ance of natural forces and thereby impose monopoly. In Justice White's
allegory of natural reason, the literalists were an extraneous force foreign
to this natural system. Their unreasonable imposition of competition
would annihilate freedom of contract, the center of Justice White's imag-
inary system. Thus, under the rule of reason, government intervention
was proper only when proscribing "unlawful contracts having a monop-
olistic tendency. ' 235 Hence, liberty of contract did not require equaliza-
tion of market power, as did industrial liberty. Nor did it demand fair
profits or fair return on property put into the market. Rather, liberty of
contract meant freedom from governmental intervention, except to regu-
late unreasonable restraints of trade.
This category of monopolistic contracts was ambiguous, whether or
not it was circumscribed by the traditional doctrines of common-law re-
straints. Still, both the Standard Oil and American Tobacco Companies
were found to have made "unlawful contracts having a monopolistic ten-
dency. '236 The Court upheld the decrees calling for dissolution in both
cases. Given these harsh consequences, the Court's imaginative shift to
the rule of reason should have had an immediate deterrent effect on
trustbuilding. Despite ongoing factionalism on the Court, the Standard
Oil and American Tobacco Co. cases stood as examples of a unified will to
engage in trustbusting. The splintered Court in Northern Securities could
no longer be relied on for the view that mergers were safe alternatives to
price fixing cartels. Yet, no one took the new jurisprudence to be a threat
to corporate mergers, particularly not those in the business community
who were intent on merging with competitors. Indeed, by 1914, Senator
234. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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Thompson could read into the Congressional Record a list of 445 active
trusts.
237
Despite the fact that the 1911 opinions used the rule of reason to
break up the great oil and tobacco trusts, this new rationale was widely
perceived to be pro-big business. Why the public outrage? Though most
Supreme Court opinions do not attain cultural significance, a few do be-
come public currency. Like Brown v. Board of Education238 and Roe v.
Wade, 239 Standard Oil resolved an issue embedded in (ideo)logical con-
troversy. Just as the two more recent opinions confronted questions of
race and gender relations, Standard Oil can be understood as raising
questions of class relations. The public's identification with Justice
Peckham's image of a middle class of "small dealers and worthy men" 240
at the mercy of the powerful trusts provides the context for understand-
ing how the "rule of reason" quickly became the protrust symbol that
stirred public sentiment and congressional action, despite the apparently
severe antitrust consequences of corporate dissolution (the antitrust ver-
sion of capital punishment). 241 While it is unlikely that the lawyerly
niceties of the shift to a "rule of reason" were widely known, it was easy
to understand the difference between prohibiting every restraint of com-
petition and prohibiting only unreasonable ones. Consumers, grangers,
small businessmen, union members, muckrakers, politicians, financiers,
and industrialists all could decide, in their own terms, who might benefit
and who might lose from this shift. Indeed, no one has ever doubted that
the 1914 antitrust legislation was passed in reaction to the rule of reason.
What has not been clear before, however, is the significance for antitrust
jurisprudence, of the 1914 statutes' explicit language of "competition,"
which is quite different from the Sherman Act's common-law language of
restraint of trade and monopolization. 242 What becomes clear is the con-
nection between Congress' legislation in reaction to the rule of reason
and the literalist rhetoric of "full and free competition."
Reaction against the Court's rule of reason was widespread. Some
in the legal community immediately expressed concern over a perceived
weakening of the Sherman Act. Later reactions, including those in the
237. 51 CONG. REC. 14218-21 (1914) (statement of Sen. Thompson).
238. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
239. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
240. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 240, 323 (1897).
241. The image of individual entrepreneurism appeared in the labor union movement as
well, particularly in their credo of equality of opportunity. See H. THORELLI, supra note 3, at
147.
242. For a discussion of Sherman Act legislative history and its references to competition,
see supra notes 29-53 and accompanying text.
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business community, complained of the practical effects of the rule of
reason-namely dissolution and its effect on competition. 243
In particular, the practical effects of the Standard Oil case were dis-
tressing. Senator Reed reported during the Clayton Act debates that the
so-called rivals created in the oil industry produced even more wealth for
their shareholders in fragmented form than they did as the Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey.244 Moreover, both the oil and tobacco trusts'
offspring were still engaging in predatory pricing and other forms of un-
fair competition against independents. 245 Much like the regional operat-
ing companies that have provided local telephone service since the 1982
,agreement between AT&T and the Reagan Administration, Standard
Oil's offspring enjoyed (unregulated) regional monopolies and were
owned by a common pool of shareholders. In material terms, the disso-
lution was consistent with Justice White's dissenting opinion in Northern
Securities, which argued against federal regulation of an individual's
purchases of property, regardless of the effects on competition. Here,
property ownership-holding shares of the Standard Oil Company-was
not disturbed. Even more troubling was the fact that the 1911 Standard
Oil miniatures were run by common management.246 Thus, despite the
dissolutions, there was no effective change in market power. Continued
market domination protected the value of shareholders' property. De-
spite decrees requiring formalistic changes, there was no redistribution of
wealth or market power from the miniatures to their trading partners
and rivals. Given the continued predatory practices of the miniatures,
the rule of reason had fostered no practical improvements in the quantity
or quality of competition. In sum, the rule of reason decisions had no
equalizing effects on market power or distribution of wealth. In practical
terms, the status quo ante survived the dissolutions.
Legislative reaction to the Court's rule of reason appeared at both
the state and federal levels. Between 1911 and 1913 twenty states
quickly passed new antitrust laws.247 Then in 1914 Congress passed two
243. 51 CONG. REc. 15864, 15866 (1914) (statement of Sen. Reed); id. at 14211-12 (1914)
(statement of Sen. Shield); id. at 14520 (1914) (letter of J.T. Suter); see A.H. WALKER, supra
note 137. For an interesting analysis of the Supreme Court's 19th century contract clause
cases and the jurisprudence of "reason," see Siegel, supra note 78.
244. 51 CONG. REC. 9267, 14211-12, 14520, 15864, 15866 (1914).
245. Id.; see also E. JONES, supra note 131, at 46-87. But see McGee, Predatory Price
Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137, 143 (1958) (arguing that the trial
records contain no evidence of predatory pricing activities).
246. 51 CONG. REc. 14520 (1914).
247. A few state statutes actually preceded 1911. Moreover, the figure of 20 statutes is the
arithmetic mean of two different figures that appear in the debates. See 51 CONG. REc. 15857
(1914) (Senate figure, 19 states); 51 CONG. REC. 9157 (1914) (House figure, 21 states).
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statutes. Though radically different in regulatory philosophy, 248 both
statutes deployed the language of "competition" abandoned by the New
Majority. The Clayton Act proscribed a set of specific practices whose
effect "may be to substantially lessen competition, '249 while the Federal
Trade Commission Act called for a regulatory agency to determine and
enjoin "unfair methods of competition. ' 250 Perhaps the requirements of
substantiality and unfairness were in some sense concessions to the prop-
erty position. Nonetheless, congressional choice of the term "competi-
tion" in reaction to the New Majority's rhetorics of "liberty" and
"property" reintroduced the logic of competition as a powerful force in
the production of antitrust law.
Justice White's rule of reason opinions elaborated upon Justice
Holmes' stark statement in Northern Securities that the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act says nothing about competition. Yet, by 1914 legislative activ-
ity in Congress and in the several states had produced explicit connec-
tions between antitrust and competition. At the very least, the tension
between property and competition was recharged.
IV. The Logical Structure of Early Antitrust Law
The preceding history of early antitrust law chronicles a confronta-
tion between property and competition logics. The tension between these
two logics produced Senator Sherman's 1888 Anti-Trust Bill and its con-
cern for the consumer, the debates over its provisions, and the break to
the 1890 Bill's language of "restraint of trade." This same tension also
was responsible for the Court's literalist period and the rule of reason
that displaced it. While competition logic and an associated impulse to-
ward equality were factors in the production of early antitrust discourse,
deep commitments to liberty and property rights produced an opposing
logic that later dominated competition logic.
In the course of describing the competition rhetorics of industrial
liberty and full and free competition, a second tension emerged. Im-
pulses toward liberty and equality were seen as forces animating a ten-
sion within the notion of industrial liberty. Later, these same impulses
were shown to be working in the property rhetorics of fair return on
property and liberty of contract. It is clear that commitments to liberty
and equality participated in the very conflict between competition and
property logics. While these tensions, and the interplay between them,
248. 51 CONG. REC. 16144 (1914).
249. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
250. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 41 (1982)).
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are not necessarily stable over time, a structural analysis of the logic of
early antitrust law can serve a clarifying function at this juncture. The
following section presents such a stop-action description-a schematic
mapping-of the structure and dynamics of early antitrust history.
While modem antitrust jurisprudence is the product of a history
that does not stop in 1914, these fundamental tensions can help make
sense of that history. Take for example the notion of industrial liberty
and its conflicting impulses toward liberty and equality. The very same
tension is evident in the modem idiom of "free competition." On the one
hand, free competition can represent the belief that private restraints of
competition are good because they are rational responses to market con-
ditions. In this sense, governmental restraints are bad because they im-
pinge upon individual liberty of contract, without which markets cannot
function. The implication is that free competition and price fixing cartels
are perfectly compatible. We have seen this logic at work in the Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.251 opinion's view of competition
as survival of the fittest, and in that court's refusal to enjoin a price fixing
cartel from using predatory prices to protect its monopoly power. On
the other hand, free competition or industrial liberty can also reflect the
belief that private restraints are bad because they produce or apply mo-
nopoly power. In this sense, government restraints are good when they
tend to dissolve monopoly power. The implication here is that free com-
petition and price fixing cartels are incompatible. The literalists applied
this logic in the railroad ratemaking association cases to break up price
fixing cartels, thereby imposing "full and free competition," to benefit
not only independent producers, but also consumers.252
Impulses toward liberty and equality have been seen in the workings
of property logic as well. On the one hand, the property logic appearing
in the congressional debates over the Sherman Act called for passage of a
statute that would protect the fair profit of independent entrepreneurs
from the extremes of competition and combination. This impulse toward
equalizing market power to equalize wealth, not taken up in the early
cases, seemed to authorize the courts to develop a common law of com-
petitive torts to protect both consumers and independent entrepreneurs
251. 23 Q.B.D. 598, 614-15 (1889), aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25, 58-60; see supra notes 101-02 and
accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 133-96 and accompanying text; Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act,
supra note 3, at 1608-19; Fox, supra note 3, at 1146-55; Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the
Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REv. 325, 332 (1968);
Note, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L.J. 86,
92-93 (1969) (authored by John C. Ladd).
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from cartels and trusts.253 On the other hand, the property logic driving
the rule of reason called for government protection of monopoly power
and profit, unless acquired by unreasonable means. Criticized in Justice
Harlan's Northern Securities opinion, this impulse toward liberty some-
times took the form of fundamental rights of contract, property, or
liberty.254
To give a fuller view of the implications of these logics as they ap-
peared in antitrust's formative years, these logics are reorganized below
according to their relationships to equality and liberty. "Equality," as it
is used here, means the following: Having many competitors with
roughly equal market power is, in and of itself, a social good because it
makes the process of competition more fair or just. In addition, regulat-
ing the extremes of competition and combination produces a more equi-
table distribution of wealth. Market participants can expect a fair return
on capital or labor put into the market, and consumers can expect to pay
a fair price for goods and services. Finally, as Justice Peckham wrote in
Joint Traffic Association, having many competitors and an equitable dis-
tribution of wealth encourages civic virtue.255 That is, a vibrant middle
class of "small dealers and worthy men" is crucial to the workings of
democratic government because their economic freedom allows them
better opportunity to act independently in social and political matters. 25 6
In contrast, the following is an abstraction of the notion of liberty as
it appeared in antitrust's formative years: Liberty of contract and free-
dom in the use of one's property are, in and of themselves, fundamental
rights in a democratic society.257 Further, these fundamental rights al-
low individuals to combine in commercial ventures. Consequently, indi-
viduals are able to shelter from the ravages of ruinous competition a
reasonable return from property or labor put into the market. Protecting
these fundamental rights as well as the expectation of reasonable profits
is necessary for the maintenance of some competitive markets.
Employing these logics of competition and property, as well as im-
pulses toward equality and liberty, a snapshot of the logical structure of
early antitrust law might look like this:
253. Cf Lande, supra note 3, at 93-106; supra notes 51-86 and accompanying text.
254. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 333-34 (1904).
255. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898).
256. See, e.g.. Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPO-
RATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85-105 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
257. Northern Sec., 193 U.S. at 239-95 (defendants' arguments); id. at 364-72, 397 (White,
J., dissenting).
[Vol. 40
PROPERTY
..................... ."....................... E
government protection of gvme p t
of fair profit to the
B monopoly power & profit reu AE.L
R government sanction of government imposition of : I
T survival of the fittest full & free competition : T
Y ........ o......... .. .. .......................
COMPETITION
The field diagram represents relationships developed from the legis-
lative debates, court opinions, and other textual materials from the early
years of antitrust law. The top half of the diagram represents the domain
of property and the bottom half represents the domain of competition.
The line separating them, running across the diagram, can be thought of
as the border, or battle line, between their incommensurate assumptions
and beliefs. Whereas property logic evaluates market transactions ac-
cording to their impact on individual ownership and exchange rights,
competition logic judges market transactions based on their effects on the
market process. The right half of the diagram reflects the impulse to-
ward equality; the left half, the impulse toward liberty. The vertical line
between them can be imagined as a barrier that both connects them and
anchors their opposing impulses.
It is clear that both relationships-between property and competi-
tion, and between equality and liberty-are tensions, not simple opposi-
tions. In other words, though property and competition logics have
produced conflicting antitrust doctrine, they also support one another.
For example, the rule of reason faction believed that protection of prop-
erty rights drives competitive markets. The notions of liberty and equal-
ity share a similar relationship of tension, rather than simple opposition.
For example, the literalists believed that a large class of individual entre-
preneurs is better than a large class of middle managers because the
rough equality associated with this large middle class of independent
businesspeople tends to disperse the power required to enjoy liberty. The
inequality inherent in answering to one's superiors in large corporate hi-
erarchies tends to limit the ways in which those with less power can exer-
cise liberty. Freedom to make a choice requires freedom from the
imposition of another's choice. In sum, the idea of a tension suggests
that there is both conflict and mutual support in the two relationships.
The field diagram is also divided into four quadrants, each of which
grounds the early antitrust policy produced by an interaction between
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the two tensions. The upper left quadrant, where the commitment to
liberty influences property logic, represents the policy of government
protection of monopoly power and profit. The rule of reason and its con-
cern for freedom of contract were products of the interaction of these two
forces in this area. The lower left quadrant, where liberty influences
competition logic, represents the policy of government sanction of sur-
vival of the fittest. The clearest example of this policy position is the
British common-law case of Mogul Steamship Co. 258 The lower right
quadrant, where competition logic acts instead on the impulse toward
equality, represents the policy of government imposition of workable
competition. Although Justice Holmes characterized this policy as at-
omization of rivals to impose perfect competition, the literalists counte-
nanced some restraints, making their view closer to what we today might
call workable competition.25 9 Finally, the upper right quadrant, where
equality sentiments shape property logic, represents the policy of govern-
ment protection of fair profit to independent entrepreneurs. The con-
gressional debates included numerous calls for fair return on capital or
labor put in the market. 260
While this field diagram was developed from antitrust's early years,
it also represents the logical structure that supports modern antitrust
law. As described in a forthcoming study on vertical restraints doctrine,
the field diagram depicts a logical structure that makes sense of the seem-
258. 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd, 1892 A.C. 25.
259. Regarding the notion of "workable competition," see supra note 51 and sources cited
therein.
260. A few words should be said about the diagram itself, which is a snapshot of a dy-
namic process. First, the boundaries between quadrants are porous. If the operators (competi-
tion, property, liberty, equality) were simple oppositions, there would be no seepage. But
because the tensions between them include an element of mutual support as well as conflict,
there may be doctrinal flow across lines. For example, liberty needs equality, competition
needs property, and so on. Second, the quadrants need not be the same size, though the dia-
gram shows them as equal. In other words, at any given moment in history, the productive
capacities of all four quadrants need not remain equal. There are numerous ways to describe
this phenomenon. Here are three variations: (1) One of the two intersecting lines (or axes)
could rotate. For example, if the vertical line connecting PROPERTY and COMPETITION
rotated in a clockwise direction, the P/C line could cut a 45 degree angle through the upper
right and lower left quadrants. This rotation would extend the influence of liberty in the upper
PROPERTY half of the field and constrict its influence in the lower COMPETITION section.
(2) One axis could migrate, while remaining perpendicular to the other axis. For example, if
the horizontal line connecting LIBERTY and EQUALITY moved up the page toward the
PROPERTY operator, the upper PROPERTY half of the structure would decrease in size,
and the lower COMPETITION section would grow larger. (3) Finally, one axis could levitate.
The P/C line could rise from the page. With this movement, interactions between tensions
might decrease in intensity. Each of these possibilities-rotation, migration, and levitation-
carries the same implication: that the field diagram as presented is a snapshot of a dynamic
historical process.
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ingly haphazard movements of current case law, as well as its misunder-
stood connections to doctrinal antecedents. 261 There may be other
grounds for the production of antitrust law and for the production of
other law or simply other discourse. Most likely, however, a statement
located on another field diagram simply does not appear to us to be a
statement about antitrust law, unless it also occupies a position on the
diagram appearing above.
One thing this map does not tell us is where any particular statement
is positioned. Nonetheless, we can identify likely locations, just as law-
yers and scholars have always done, by making informed judgments
about the relative strengths of particular legal arguments in local set-
tings. What is clear now, however, are the logics supporting antitrust
argument. Thus, modem antitrust law, whether court opinion, journal
article, jury instruction, or legislative conference report, can be under-
stood in terms of the interplay of these two tensions. Do the texts indi-
cate strong commitments to liberty or equality? Do they deploy the logic
of competition or property? What doctrinal changes tend to accompany
shifts in commitments? Considering such questions not only helps to ex-
plain seemingly haphazard shifts in doctrine, but also reveals how mod-
em antitrust law still embodies the same tension between competition
and property, and the same impulses toward equality and liberty.
Conclusion
In antitrust's formative years, shifting balances of power between
rhetorical modes were evident from the earliest moments of the Sherman
Act's legislative history, through the history of struggle between the "lit-
eralist" and "rule of reason" factions, to passage of the twin 1914 stat-
utes. But those battles settled nothing. Nor could they prove that one
logic was somehow better or stronger. Rather, those confrontations rep-
resented the very conditions of possibility for early antitrust law.
As we approach the centennial of the Sherman Act's passage, policy
issues and the doctrinal alternatives in antitrust can now be analyzed in
terms that not only include competition, but also recognize the funda-
mental conflict with the common-law logic of property rights. Whether
we imagine them as mutually constituted, or whether we imagine compe-
tition policy as embedded in a pre-existing common-law property regime,
or whether we imagine common-law property rights as subject to compe-
tition policy, we can no longer ignore the property logic that produced
261. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HAsTINGS L.J. (1989)
(forthcoming).
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early antitrust doctrine. The right to a "fair profit," the liberty to com-
bine, and the freedom to dispose of one's assets are all historical instances
of property logic in restraint of competition.
Competition logic exhibits an internal tension as well, animated by
commitments to liberty and equality. That tension continues to operate
in the modern idiom of "free competition," which can be understood as
freedom from private market power or from government intervention.
Thus, competition free from private market power implies that govern-
mental intervention is good when it equalizes market power. But compe-
tition free of sovereign power means that governmental intervention is
bad because it impinges on individual liberty. The context for analyzing
antitrust law is completed with the recognition that the same commit-
ments to liberty and equality produced tensions in the logic of property
rights as well.
Finally, it is important to make explicit an important implication
regarding the relationship between competition and efficiency. This
study introduces an analytical structure for understanding how the ten-
sion between the competition policy and property rights has produced
the efficiency norm in its various forms. In short, it shows a different
mechanism at work in the production of antitrust doctrine, sharply dif-
ferent from the orthodox view that competition represents the only posi-
tive norm for antitrust and contrary to today's neoclassical view that
efficiency is a proxy for competition. Placing competition into its logical
and historical context allows us to recapture the positive values associ-
ated with combinations, small businesses, fair profit, and other doctrinal
formulations that we currently associate with negative values such as
"anticompetitive" practices or "anti-efficiency" policies. With an analyt-
ical structure that recognizes antitrust doctrine as a series of sociopoliti-
cal choices, we can start the Sherman Act's second century by making
better informed judgments about antitrust doctrine and policy.
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